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I. INTRODUCTION

"Cronyism," which generally refers to an anticonsumer and
corrupting affiliation between government and special interests, is a
growing bipartisan concern today.' "Cronyism" is popular shorthand for
government-granted privileges or favoritism,2 which come in many
flavors and have many economic and social costs.3 This Article
documents the evolution of government-granted privileges in the
information and communications technology marketplace and in the
media-producing sectors.
Various political privileges have been dispensed in the traditional
communications and media markets, most often in the form of
regulatory favoritism.4 Cronyism and government-granted privileges are
also creeping into the modern high-tech and Internet-related sectors,
most notably in the form of generous tax credits.5 This Article
1. See Michael De Groote, Crony Capitalism: Why the Tea Party and Occupy
Movements Should Be Friends, DESERET NEWS (July 9, 2012, 7:40 AM), http://www.deseret
news.com/article/865558699/Crony-capitalism-Why-the-tea-party-and-Occupy-movements-sho
uld-be-friends.html; 39% Say US. Has Crony Capitalist System, RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 18,
2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publiccontent/business/general_business/january
2012/39_say_u_shas crony capitalistsystem.
2.

DAVID R. HENDERSON, MERCATUS CTR., THE ECONOMICS AND HISTORY OF CRONYISM

7 (2012), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/economics-and-history-cronyism
("[U]nder cronyism the government rigs the market for the benefit of government officials'
cronies.... In short, cronyism plays favorites.").
3. Id. at 4 ("Cronyism is not simply a zero-sum game that takes from some and gives to
others; it is negative-sum. The losses to the losers substantially outweigh the gains to the
winners. In short, cronyism destroys wealth.").
4. See Roberth Hahn, Liberating the Market/Cable's Regulatory Stranglehold on
Broadband, SF GATE (Mar. 1, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/
article/Liberating-the-Market-Cable-s-regulatory-2787917.php
(indicating that "companies
should build their empires by beating the competition, not through regulatory favoritism.").
5. See Richard Rubin, Microsoft Joins Merck in Pitch for Tech-Friendly Tax Code,

2013]

A HISTORY OF CRONYISMAND CAPTURE IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYSECTOR

133

inventories some of the tax privileges that communications and media
companies enjoy today.
The danger of creeping cronyism in the high-tech field is that it will
dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector.
The opportunity costs of pursuing favors are significant. 6 Time and
resources spent influencing politicians and capturing regulators could
instead be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace.
Cronyism can thus negatively impact consumer welfare in two ways:
not only does it deny consumers more and better products and services,
but consumers may also pay higher prices or higher taxes extracted by
the corporate-government agreement. Moreover, economic growth
slows as entrepreneurs pursue unproductive influence and capture
activities rather than productive entrepreneurship. 9
Cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the
Internet and of the digital economy more generally. When policymakers
dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They may also
become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector
receiving favors. That result would be highly unfortunate for the
information technology sector, since the Internet has largely developed
and thrived in an unregulated environment.10 Indeed, the Internet's
decentralized, bottom-up nature has been crucial to its success." B
contrast, Washington's slow, administrative control of industries
represents the antithesis of the digital economy. To avoid a predictable
decline in innovation and consumer welfare, this Article offer strategies
for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the
information and communications technology marketplace and in the
BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/micros
oft-joins-merck-in-pitch-for-tech-friendly-tax-code.html).
6.

See MATTHEW MITCHELL, MERCATUS CTR., THE PATHOLOGY OF PRIVILEGE: THE

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM 17-18 (2012), available at http://

mercatus.org/publication/pathology-privilege-economic-consequences-govemment-favoritism.
7, Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 15-17; Christine Harbin Hanson, A Case Study in Rent Seeking: The Big Wind
Lobby and the PTC, AMERICANS

FOR PROSPERITY (Nov.

12, 2013), http://americansfor

prosperity.org/legislative alerts/a-case-study-in-rent-seeking-the-big-wind-lobby-and-the-ptc/.
9.
10.

MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 19-20.
GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 93

(2002) ("The Internet has developed largely as a spontaneous order without a central
coordinating authority."); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulationof the Internet 5-6, 24
(Office of Plans & Pol'y, FCC, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at http://transition.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp3 I.pdf.
11. Adam Thierer, Does the Internet Need a Global Regulator?, FORBES (May 6, 2012,
11:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/05/06/does-the-internet-need-a-glo
bal-regulator.
12. See John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137, 168 (2013).
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media-producing sectors.' 3
II. WHENCE GOVERNMENT-GRANTED PRIVILEGES?
Before exploring how cronyism affects communications, media, and
high-tech markets, this Article first discusses the economic theory of
regulation and the insights of the public-choice school of economics in
particular. These insights help explain why cronyism and governmentgranted privilege are such persistent political problems.
A. The Economic Theory ofRegulation
Under the traditional "public interest" theory of regulation,
lawmakers and regulators are assumed to be enlightened and benevolent
actors' 4 who can identify and correct market failures, thereby
maximizing social welfare or other public interest objectives., Public
interest goals typically include lower prices, quality service, widespread
access or "universal service," and other health, safety, or social
regulations. Regulation is assumed to further these objectives.
This view was predominant in the first half of the 20th century,16 but
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, various economists and political
scientists began rigorously documenting the shortcomings of the public
interest theory of regulation.17 Scholars associated with the publicchoice schools of economics and specifically, the Chicago School of
Economics primarily led the rethinking of the traditional textbook
13. See Peter Coy, Facebook Gets a Multibillion-Dollar Tax Break, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-15/facebookgets-a-multi-billion-dollar-tax-break (noting that members of technology and media industry
receive tax breaks); see also Luke Rosiak, Obama Crony Wins Contract to Give Phones to
Jobless, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/5/
obama-crony-wins-contract-to-give-phones-to-jobles/ (noting that a cellphone company, whose
CEO has "close ties" to President Obama, received a large and much lobbied-for contract).
14.

RANDY T. SIMMONS,

BEYOND POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE 42

(2011) ("For more than one hundred years the basic vision of bureaucracy has been that
efficiency is promoted by professional, nonpartisan administration directed by a strong
executive. ... Scientific management of public agencies ... is based on the belief that 'right-

minded' managers, who are not motivated by profit or other selfish goals, will protect the public
interest while managing government agencies, programs and properties.").
15.

DAVID

L.

KASERMAN

&

JOHN W. MAYO,

GOVERNMENT

ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 518 (1995);

AND

BUSINESS:

THE

see BARRY M. MITNICK, THE

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY

FORMS 91-93, 242-48 (1980).

16.

See I JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public

Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERY 45-46 (1999).
17. See EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER 33-37 (2012).
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theory of regulation.' 8
Today, some economists agree with law professor Fred S.
McChesney's assessment that "[t]he notion that government regulates in
some disinterested, 'public interest' fashion to repair market failure has
crumbled. Too much regulation is demonstrably at odds with the
general welfare for any such public-interest explanation now to be taken
seriously." 9 Indeed, the authors of two of the leading textbooks on
economic regulation conclude that "[tihe fundamental problem with the
public interest theory of regulation is that it simply does not perform
well empirically[,]'"2 and that it "has lacked supporters for several
decades ... [because of] the large amount of evidence that refutes it." 2 1
Scholars from these two schools of thought documented numerous
deficiencies with the public interest theory of regulation and, in the
process, developed an "economic theory of regulation," which applies
economic analysis and insights to explain how law and regulation are
actually formulated.2222 This Part II focuses on two of the most important
insights flowing from the economic theory of regulation since they are
especially relevant to modern cronyism: rent-seeking and regulatory
capture.
1. Rent-seeking
Nobel prize-winning economist James M. Buchanan perhaps best
described public-choice analysis as "[p]olitics [w]ithout [r]omance[.]" 23
Public choice strips away the "public interest" and "common good"
gloss sometimes associated with government regulation and public
resource management.24 Instead, using the tools and assumptions of

18. Richard M. Ebeling, Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics, 56
FREEMAN 2, 2-3 (2006). The public-choice school is also called the Virginia School because of
affiliated scholars at the University of Virginia and George Mason University. See Peter J.
Boettke, Virginia PoliticalEconomy: A View from Vienna, in 5 THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS
IN CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 244 (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds.
1994); DENNIS C. MUELLER, LECTURES ON VIRGINIA POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE 'VIRGINIA

SCHOOL' AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 5, 10-11 (1985).
19.

FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND

POLITICAL EXTORTION 156 (1997).
20. KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 15, at 518.
21. W. KiP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 326 (Mass. Inst.

of Tech. 2d ed. 1995).
22. See Joseph P. Kaltz & Mark A. Zupan, Capture andIdeology in the Economic Theory
ofPolitics, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 279, 279 (1984).
23.
24.

BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 13.
SUSAN E. DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 17 (2012) ("Public choice

analysis posits that government officials are not systematically engaged in maximizing the
public interest, but are attempting to maximize their own private interests. . . . In particular,
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economics, public-choice analysis shows how political actors are
frequently as self-interested and prone to mistakes as private actors. 25
"Much of the growth of the bureaucratic or regulatory sector of
government," noted Buchanan, "can best be explained in terms of the
competition between political agents for constituency support through
the use of promises of discriminatory transfers of wealth." 26 For these
reasons, public-choice scholars often speak of "government failure," the
public sector analog to "market failure." 27
"Rent-seeking" and "rent extraction" are the mechanisms behind
how legislation and regulation often work in practice. 28 "Rents" in this
context generally refer to "the above-normal profits of a privileged
firm."29 As applied to political activities, rent-seeking could more
simply be thought of as privilege-seeking, or an effort to secure
favorable tax or regulatory treatment. 30 "[R]ent seeking as popularly
perceived refers to legal and illegal activities to obtain special
privilege," notes Gordon Tullock, who, along with Buchanan, is
considered one of the intellectual godfathers of the public-choice
school. 3' Or, more simply, as economist Randy T. Simmons argues,
rent-seeking comes down to "obtaining more wealth and income
through political action." 32
Rent-seeking primarily describes the demand side of political
favoritism: the favorable treatment that affected parties seek.33 The
supply side-the dispensing of favors by political actors34_iS also
important. In this "rent extraction" model of regulation, McChesney
notes, "[p]oliticians are seen not as mere brokers redistributing wealth
public choice is concerned with the economic waste inherent in efforts to change laws or
regulations in order to privilege one group over another.").
25. SIMMONs, supra note 14, at 51. ("Public choice is the study of political or public
choices using the tools and assumptions of economics.").
26. Id at 16.
27.

TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 10.

28. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 291 (1974).
29. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 17.
30.

David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS

(David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Rent
Seeking.html.
31.
32.

TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 44.
SIMMoNs, supra note 14, at 119.

33. See Jaired Stallard, Abuse of the PardonPower: A Legal and Economic Perspective,
1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 103, 113 n.71 (2002) ("An example of rent-seeking in the political
market is when a corporation pays a 'rent' to Congressmen in the form of financial campaign
contributions, and in return, the corporation demands favorable legislation for them individually
or the industry in general.").
34. See id. at 113 ("[P]olitical actors, who are in the position to provide the special
benefits, are willing to supply the transfer of wealth for a certain price.").
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in response to competing private demands, but as independent actors
making their own demands to which private actors respond."3 They
also threaten to hand out punishments (by destroying or expropriating
private rents) and can obtain 3ayments from interested parties in
exchange for not punishing them. McChesney refers to this process as
"extortion by politicians" in that policymakers are often "paid not to
legislate." 37
2. Regulatory Capture
"Capture theory is closely related to the 'rent-seeking' and 'political
failure' theories developed by . .. public choice school [scholars]." 3 8 A
long line of economists and political scientists have documented how
affected parties often "capture" the regulatory process and use it for
their own ends. 39 The public interest theory of regulation failed to
anticipate the recurring reality that special interests frequently have the
ear of regulators and extract substantial benefits at the expense of the
general public. 40
Scholars developed a new theory of refulation to help explain why
the traditional paradigm was incomplete. In particular, University of
Chicago economist George Stigler's pioneering work in developing the
economic theory of regulation revealed how "as a rule, regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit."4 2 Stigler's explanation was straightforward: "The state-the
machinery and power of the state-is a potential resource or threat to
every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to
take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast
number of industries."4 3 Thus, a strong incentive exists for affected
interests to capture "the machinery and the power of the state," 44 since,
35. MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 157.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 41.
38. Adam Thierer, Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found, TECH.
LIBERATION FRONT (Dec. 19, 2010), http://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capturewhat-the-experts-have-found.
39. See id.
40. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5 (1998) ("Where . . . the relevant decisionmakers operate
without oversight, they tend to deliver regulatory benefits to well organized interest groups at
the public's expense.").
41. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21,passim.
42. George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGMT. ScI.
3, 3 (1971); see VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 21, passim (offering a broader discussion of capture
theory).
43. Stigler, supra note 42.
44. Id
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as McChesney noted, "government regulation had the power to create
benefits that were unavailable other than through politics, or were more
cheaply available through politics." 45 Sam Peltzman and other Chicago
School scholars would refine Stigler's model to construct a more robust
economic theory of regulation and explain the prevalence of capture
within political systems. 4 6
Many other scholars have identified capture as a recurring problem,
especially in regulated network industries.4 7 UCLA economist Harold
Demsetz concluded that in many network sectors or utility industries,
"regulation has often been sought because of the inconvenience of
competition." 48 The histories of the railroad and airline industries
provide particularly egregious examples of regulatory capture. 49 Each
45.

MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 9-10.

46. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211 passim (1976); see also Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups
for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 passim (1983).
47. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory ofPoliticalAction in a Democracy, 65 J.
POL. ECON. 135 passim (1957); see also William A. Jordan, Producer Protection,PriorMarket
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151 passim (1972); Mark
Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man,
82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973); Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation:
The PoliticalFoundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
passim (1981); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory
Economist, 7 REG. 12 passim (1983); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in
the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 passim (1987); Jean-Jacques Laffont
& Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture,
106 Q.J. EcON. 1089 passim (1991).
48. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55, 61 (1968).
49. Thomas Frank of the Wall Street Journal explained that,
The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was
set up to regulate railroad freight rates in the 1880s. Soon thereafter, Richard
Olney, a prominent railroad lawyer, came to Washington to serve as Grover
Cleveland's attorney general. Olney's former boss asked him if he would help
kill off the hated ICC. Olney's reply, handed down at the very dawn of Big
Government, should be regarded as an urtext of the regulatory state:
"The Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It
satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads, at
the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the
older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take
the business and railroad view of things. ... The part of wisdom is not to
destroy the Commission, but to utilize it."
Thomas Frank, Obama and 'Regulatory Capture,' WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2009, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12458046106 5744913.html. As for the airline industry, Thomas
McCraw provided that,
Clearly, in passing the Civil Aeronautics Act [of 1938], Congress intended to
bring stability to airlines. What is not clear is whether the legislature intended
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industry used its respective regulators, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), to promote
cartelization and market protectionism.50 "When capture occurs, it
lessens not only the innovation that would flow from other market
entrants and entrepreneurs but also [] innovation [by] the regulated
entity itself, which shifts its focus to controlling the regulatory process
and sheltering itself from disruptive change." 5 '
Some of the most important work on capture theory has been done
by left-of-center scholars and policy advocates. 52 In 1973, well-known
consumer advocates Mark Green and Ralph Nader noted that "a kind of
regular personnel interchange between agency and industry blurs what
should be a sharp line between regulator and regulatee, and can
compromise independent regulatory judgment. In short, the refulated
industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process."' Later,
during the Carter administration, congressional Democrats, including
the late Senator Edward Kennedy; future Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer, who worked as Senate staffer at the time; and liberal
consumer advocates, like Green and Nader, led deregulation efforts
because they became convinced that regulation was harming consumer

to cartelize the industry. Yet this did happen. During the forty years between
passage of the act of 1938 and the appointment of [Alfred] Kahn to the CAB
chairmanship, the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry
more or less in its configuration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade
price competition. Instead the CAB ordinarily required that all carriers flying a
certain route charge the same rates for the same class of customer.. . . A second
policy had to do with the CAB's stance toward the entry of new companies into
the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or not
"the public interest, convenience, and necessity" mandated that new carriers
should receive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no
applicant met these tests. In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new
trunkline carrier had been permitted to join the sixteen that existed in 1938.
And those sixteen, later reduced to ten by a series of mergers, still dominated
the industry in the 1970s. All these companies . . . developed into large

companies under the protective wing of the CAB. None wanted deregulation.
THOMAS K.

MCCRAW,

PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES

FRANCIS ADAMS;

LOUIS D.

BRANDEIS; JAMES M. LANDIS; ALFRED E. KAHN 263 (1984).

50. See KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 15, at 523 ("[T]he CAB and ICC strictly
controlled (prohibited) entry into domestic air service and severely limited entry into trucking
for many years.").
51. Adam Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities
31 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-11, 2012), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/
default/files/PerilsClassifyingSocialMediaPublicUtilities.pdf.
52.

See, e.g., Green & Nader, supra note 47; RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED

COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA (1994).

53.

Green & Nader, supra note 47.
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welfare by limiting competition and driving up prices. 54
Economist Alfred Kahn, a self-described liberal Democrat, was a
central figure in the deregulatory efforts of the 1970s, both in and out of
government.5 5 In 1970, he published a meticulous two-volume study of
the regulatory process titled The Economics ofRegulation that became a
seminal text in the field. 6 In it, he identified how capture was a
particular problem for regulated network industries:
When a commission is responsible for the performance of an
industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to
protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a
desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen
instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and
unplannable forces of competition. . . . . Responsible for the
continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory
commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify
the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on
whom it must rely to deliver [] goods.57
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed Kahn to serve as
chairman of the CAB, and Kahn promptly set to work to dismantle the
anti-consumer airline cartels sustained by government regulation.58
Kahn and the CAB achieved a veritable public policy revolution in just
a few short years. 5 9 Not only did they comprehensively deregulate
airline markets, but they also eliminated the entire regulatory
infrastructure in the process.o They did so largely based on Kahn's fear
about "the inexorable tendency for regulation in the competitive market
to spread" and be captured by special interests.6 1 Comprehensive
deregulation and agency abolition was, therefore, viewed as the logical
and necessary step. 2 Consequently, the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
54. See VIETOR, supra note 52, at 50-52; see also MCCRAw, supra note 49, at 266-68,
293-96.
55.

See Adam Thierer, Alfred Kahn - An Appreciation, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Dec.

28, 2010), http://techliberation.com/2010/12/28/alfred-kahn-an-appreciation.
56. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Prophets of Regulation, Harvard Business School
professor Thomas K. McCraw called Kahn's Economics of Regulation "one of the most
important books ever written on the subject" and noted that it catapulted Kahn into a career in
public service as a regulatory reformer. McCRAW, supra note 49, at 233.
57.

ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 46,

12 (1971).
58. Philip J. Weiser, Alfred Kahn as a Case Study of a PoliticalEntrepreneur:An Essay
in Honour ofHis 90th Birthday, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 603, 605 (2008).
59. See MCCRAw, supra note 49, at 273.
60. Id. at 273-274.
61. Id.at272.
62. Id. at 271-72.
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Act of 1984 formally abolished the CAB. 63
B. A Taxonomy of Government-GrantedPrivilegesand Their Costs
Many other scholars (and journalists) outside the public-choice and
Chicago schools have identified and analyzed the growth of what has
been alternatively called the "interest goup society,"64 "receivership by
regulation," 65 and "client politics."6 All of these concepts share a
common insight that flowed from Mancur Olson's 1965 book, The
Logic of Collective Action, which is when benefits are concentrated and
costs are dispersed (across all taxpayers, for exam1e), we can expect
groups to form to take advantage of those benefits. Those bearing the
dispersed costs will have less of an incentive to form groups to counter
those receiving the benefits. 6 8 This tendency explains why some
government programs and regulations become so entrenched and why
rent-seeking self-perpetuates.
These scholars' research and insights have supplemented and
reinforced the public-choice and Chicago School scholars' findings. 70
As a result, the economic theory of regulation has altered the way recent
generations of economists, political scientists, journalists, and even the
general public analyze and evaluate regulatory policy activities and
decision making.' While the economic theory of regulation cannot
explain all regulatory decisions or developments, it does explain with
dismaying consistency how self-interested motives lie behind many
63.

Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.

64.
65.

JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY passim (1989).
THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED

STATES 280 (2d ed. 1979).
66. James Q. Wilson said that client politics "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a
program go to some single, reasonably small interest (an industry, profession, or locality) but
most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)."
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENTS Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 76 (1989).
67. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 15, 22, 25 (1965).
68. SIMMONS, supra note 14, at 64 ("The difficulties of supporting the general interest are
compounded when concentrated interest groups are considered. A reason the politician faces
more powerful incentives to spend than to economize is . . . small groups who benefit from
government expenditures have more incentives and cheaper means of organizing than do the
diffused taxpayers.").

69.

See Michael Giberson, Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs, KNOWLEDGE

PROBLEM (Oct. 17, 2010), http://knowledgeproblem.com/2010/10/17/concentrated-benefits-anddispersed-costs.

70.

Id.

71. See JONATHAN RAUCH, GOVERNMENT'S END: WHY WASHINGTON STOPPED WORKING
38 (1994); see also TIMOTHY P. CARNEY, THE BIG RIPOFF: How BIG BUSINESS AND BIG
GOVERNMENT STEAL YOUR MONEY 2-3 (2006); CHARLES PETERS, How WASHINGTON REALLY
WoRKS 113 (4th ed. 1993).
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political decisions. 72
These insights have become even more pertinent as concerns about
crony capitalism have increased in recent years.7 3 This increased
concern has led to more focused, fine-grained research examining the
many different ways that government favoritism corrupts the political
process and capitalism. 74 Mercatus Center researcher Matthew Mitchell
has crafted a taxonomy of "the various ways in which governmentgranted privileges diminish the gains from exchange, threaten economic
growth, and undermine the legitimacy of government and the private
sector." 75 He identifies 10 categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Monopoly privilege;
Regulatory privilege;
Subsidies;
Loan guarantees;
Tax privileges;
Bailouts;
Expected bailouts;
Tariffs and quotas on foreign competition;
Noncompetitive bidding; and
Multiple privileges. 76

Most of the forms of privilege at work in the communications and
media sectors fall into categories 2, 3, and 5: regulatory privilege,
subsidies, and tax privileges. Examples of each are discussed in Parts
III and IV.
Mitchell also identifies the various economic and social costs
associated with government-granted privilege.7 8 The costs most relevant
to the sectors that this Article focuses on are the following:
1. Monopoly costs;
2. Inattention to consumer desires;
3. Unproductive entrepreneurship;
72. Political scientist James Q. Wilson has pushed back against the economic theory of
regulation and suggested it does not fully appreciate the ways in which politics differs from
economics. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION passim (1980). He argued that
"the politics of regulation follows different patterns, mobilizes different actors, and has different
consequences depending, among other things, on the perceived distribution of costs and benefits
of the proposed policy." Id. at 361-63, 371-72.
73.

See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 27.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.passim.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7-14.
Id. at 7-11.
Id. at 14-30.
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4. Loss of innovation and diminished long-run economic growth;
and
5. Loss of legitimacy (of both government institutions and
capitalism itself).
Several of these concepts are interrelated, as Tullock has explained:
Drawing the bulk of intelligent and energetic people in society
into an activity that has no social product, or may have a negative
social product, is more important in explaining the stagnation of
these societies than the direct social cost of the rent seeking ....
[L]obbyists in Washington ... are very intelligent and energetic
people . . . . They are the kind of people we would like to have
driving forward in production. . . . Most, however, are on the

other side-seeking special privilege. Unfortunately this
collection of highly intelligent and energetic people who could
make real contributions to society are reducing its efficiency.8 0
There are also other costs, including the misallocation of investment
into not just rent-seeking activities but also into the less-productive
industries that receive favors. It is worth keeping these various costs in
mind during the following examination of case studies from the history
of communications and media.

III. ANALOG-ERA CASE STUDIES OF
GOVERNMENT-GRANTED PRIVILEGE
This Part III documents several examples of government-granted

privilege at work in the communications and media sectors historically.
First, Part III.A notes how many scholars have documented the
persistent problem of regulatory gaming in communications and media
policy, especially at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
A. The PersistenceofRegulatory Privilege in Communicationsand
Media Policy
The most common forms of cronyism at work in the information
sector have been what Mitchell classifies as "monopoly privilege" and
"regulatory privilege." 82 Specifically, the dangers of regulatory capture
79. Id.
80. TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 49.
81. See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 16-17 (discussing these less-productive industries).
82. Id. at 6.
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and gaming are omnipresent in this sector, especially at the FCC.
economist Gordon L. Brady explained in 2002,

As

[D]espite
the
global
changes
in the
international
telecommunications market, the FCC remains a prime target of
rent seeking. It retains the ability to bestow, deny, or reallocate
rents among private parties through regulatory decisions and thus
to affect the value of property rights in the telecommunications
industry. Its portfolio of monopoly powers that engender rent
seeking include setting rates, granting licenses, and exercising
other Fowers that govern the nature of competition among the
firms.
Former and current FCC officials agree that capture has been an
ongoing problem at the agency and that it has imposed real economic
and social costs. Reed Hundt, FCC chairman during the Clinton
administration, has noted that "[tihe FCC has suffered, from time to
time, a reputation for agency capture by special interests, mind-boggling
delay, internal strife, lack of competence, and a dreadful record on
judicial review." 86 Likewise, former FCC commissioner Robert
McDowell notes that many telecom and media companies
[S]uffer from the "please regulate my rival" malady of an
industry that has been regulated too much and for too long.
History is replete with such scenarios, and the desire for more
regulation for competitors always ends badly for the incumbent
regulated industry in the form of unintended and harmful
consequences.8 7
Economists refer to this as "cost predation" or "raising rivals' costs."88
McDowell's assessment is correct, but the gaming at work in this
sector is not limited to efforts to have the government regulate rivals.8 9
These interests are also often looking for special favors and treatment,
and all too often, they get it, as communications and media policy
83.

See TULLOCK ETAL., supra note 10, at 104-05.

84. Id. at 106.
85. See Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and
Beyond, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 31 (2006).
86. Id.
87. Robert McDowell, Comm'r, FCC, Speech Before the Associazione Ego and Puntoit,
Italian Parliament, Aula Dei Grupi Parlamentari: The Siren Call of 'Please Regulate My Rival':
A Recipe for Regulatory Failure 5 (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/
commr-mcdowells-speech-possible-itu-regulation-internet).
88. McChesney, supra note 47, at 104.
89.

See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 7-14.
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scholars have meticulously documented. 90 Thomas Hazlett, a former
chief economist at the FCC, has noted that the FCC's initials might as
well stand for "forever captured by corporations." 9 1 Tim Wu, author of
The Master Switch, has documented the reality of regulatory capture in
the heavily regulated communications and media sectors:
Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the
shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good
information industries. The federal government's role
and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for
was nothing short of a disgrace.

protect

large

. .

state has
for the
in radio
instance,

. Government's tendency to

market players amounts

to an

illegitimate

complicity, . . . [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big

industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive. 92
The cronyism and capture that surround the FCC can impose more
widespread social and economic costs, such as those outlined in Part
II.B.9 Harvard University law professor Lawrence Lessig has noted
that,
Economic growth requires innovation. Trouble is, Washington is
practically designed to resist it. Built into the DNA of the most
important agencies created to protect innovation, is an almost
irresistible urge to protect the most powerful instead. The FCC is
a perfect example.

. .

. With so much in its reach, the FCC has

become the target of enormous campaigns for influence. Its
commissioners are meant to be "expert" and "independent," but
they've never really been expert, and are now openly embracing
the political role they play. Commissioners issue press releases
touting their own personal policies. And lobbyists spend years
getting close to members of this junior varsity Congress. 94
Even more damning are the words of communications policy experts
and former FCC officials David J. Farber and Gerald R. Faulhaber:
When the FCC asserts regulatory jurisdiction over an area of
telecommunications, the dynamic of the industry changes. No
90. See, e.g., id.
91. Weather or Not, Here It Comes, MEDIA (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.onthemedia.org/
2004/apr/30/weather-or-not-here-it-comes/transcript.
92.

TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 307-08

(2010).
93. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
94. Lawrence Lessig, Lessig: It's Time to Demolish the FCC, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 22, 2008,
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/lessig-its-time-demolish-fcc-83409.
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longer are customer needs and desires at the forefront of firms'
competitive strategies; rather firms take their competitive battles
to the FCC, hoping for a favorable ruling that will translate into a
marketplace advantage. Customer needs take second place;
regulatory "rent-seeking" becomes the rule of the day, and a
previously innovative and vibrant industry becomes a creature of
government rule-making. 9 5
What these scholars have identified are the costs of cronyism
unproductive
including rent-seeking,
outlined
by Mitchell,
entrepreneurship, inattention to consumer desires, and, most
importantly, loss of innovation and diminished long-run economic
growth.9 6 These costs manifest themselves in various ways in the
communications and media marketplaces. Specifically, companies
regularly seek government-granted advantages in the following forms:
1. Barriers to entry, most often through restrictive licensing
requirements;
2. Lighter-touch regulatory treatment for some relative to others;
3. Contractual bargaining advantages; and
4. Subsidies or favorable tax treatment. 9 7
Beyond the FCC, companies can pursue additional rent-seeking
through other federal and state agencies, such as the Commerce
and Information
Telecommunications
Department's National
Administration, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, state public
utility commissions, and local governing bodies. 98 Rent-seeking and
rent extraction are also at work in the legislative arena, where senators
and representatives on the Senate and House commerce committees and
judiciary committees regularly milk well-heeled communications,
media, and now high-tech companies for campaign contributions in
exchange for favorable treatment or differential regulation.9 9 Stanford
University economist Bruce M. Owen argues that it is here in the
legislative branch, not within the agencies themselves, where regulatory
95. David J. Farber & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Net Neutrality: No One Will Be Satisfied,
Everyone Will Complain, ATLANTIC, (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2010/12/net-neutrality-no-one-will-be-satisfied-everyone-will-complain/68
326.
96. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
97.
98.

See MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 5.
TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 10, at 106.

99. See generally Bruce M. Owen, CommunicationPolicy Reform, Interest Groups, and
Legislative Capture2 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 11-006,
2012), availableat http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/publications profile/239 1.
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capture takes root.100 Owen argues that, "It is rather legislative oversight
and budget committees and their chairs that are (willingly) captured by
special interests in the first instance. One could equally say that
legislators capture the special interests, seeking campaign funding."
Further, he writes that, "The behavior of regulatory agencies simply
reflects the preferences of their congressional masters. Regulators
generally seek to please their committees, not to defy them."' 01
B. Communications and Universal Service
Regardless of where it originates or is most routinely abused, what is
undeniable is that capture and cronyism have been prevalent in the
American communications and media marketplace for many decades.
All too often in these sectors, the government's thumb is on the scales
in someone's favor, and this favor comes at the expense of competitors
or consumers. The following case studies document this reality.
1. The Cronyist Origins of the Bell System Monopoly
The early history of communications in the United States is a prime
example of industry capture. The American Telegraph and Telephone
Company (AT&T) secured a nationwide monopoly because of its cozy
relationship with government officials.'02 From the very beginning,
economic historian Richard H. K. Vietor notes, "AT&T's near
monopoly in electronic voice communications was a function of
regulation."' 03
After Alexander Graham Bell patented the telephone in 1876, AT&T
secured hundreds of additional patents that gave the firm a temporary
monopoly in the provision of voice service.1 04 But as the nineteenth
century came to a close and those patents expired, competition from
smaller rivals blossomed. 0 5 These competitors expanded rapidly in
"areas not served by the Bell System, but then quickly began invading
AT&T's turf, especially areas where Bell service was poor." 0 6 More
than 3000 competitors existed after the turn of the century, and "[b]y
1907, non-Bell firms . . . were operating 51 percent of the telephone

100. Id passim.
101. Id.
102. See generallyVIETOR, supra note 52, at 167-233.
103. Id. at 318.
104. See Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: CriticalMoments in the Development of
the Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 267,269 (1994).
105. Id. at 270.
106. Id
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businesses in local markets."' 0 7 "After thirteen years of competition,"
observed industry historian Gerald W. Brock, "the United States had an
extensive system of six million telephones, almost evenly divided
between Bell and the independents, with service available practically
anywhere in the country." 0 8 This heated competition increased
consumer service options, drove down prices, and cut into AT&T's
earlier profitability.109
A decade later, however, this intensely competitive, pro-consumer
free-for-all would be derailed by AT&T's brilliant strategy to use the
government to accomplish what it could not in the free market:
eliminate its rivals.'1 0
In 1907, Theodore Newton Vail became AT&T's president."' He
had a clear vision: achieving "universal service" (in the form of
interconnected and fully integrated systems) by eliminating rivals and
consolidating networks. 12 Befriending lawmakers and regulators was a
crucial component of this strategy. 113 While many policymakers
nominally supported the idea of competition, they were more
preoccupied with achieving widespread, interconnected network
coverage.1 14 Vail capitalized on that impulse. 15
On December 19, 1913, the government and AT&T reached the
"Kingsbury Commitment," which was named after AT&T vice
president Nathan C. Kingsbury, who helped negotiate the terms." 6 The
agreement outlined a plan whereby AT&T agreed not to acquire any
other independent companies while also allowing other competitors to
interconnect with the Bell System."' 7 The agreement was perceived as
pro-competitive; however, it was hardly an altruistic agreement on
behalf of AT&T." 8 Regulators did not interpret the agreement "so as to
restrict AT&T from acquiring any new telephone systems, but only to
require that an equal number be sold to an independent buyer for each
107. Id.; see GERALD W. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 112, 121 (1981).
108. BROCK, supra note 107, at 122.
109. Whereas AT&T had earned an average return on investment of 46% in the late 1800s,
by 1906 its return had dropped to 8%. LEONARD S. HYMAN, RICHARD C. TOOLE & ROSEMARY M.
AVELLIS, THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION 78

(1987).
110. See Thierer,supranote 104, at 271.
111. Id.
112. Id. at272.
113. Id.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.

116.

Id

117.

Id.

118.

Id.
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system AT&T purchased."ll 9 Thus, rather than providing an incentive
for continuing and increasing competition, "the Kingsbury Commitment
contained a built-in incentive for [network]-swapping" (trading systems
and solidifying territorial monopolies).120 "The government solution, in
short, was not the steamy, unsettling cohabitation that marks
competition but rather a sort of competitive apartheid, characterized by
segregation and quarantine," observe telecom legal experts Michael
Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter Huber.121 Thus, the move toward
interconnection, while appearing to assist independent operators,
actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry.122
"Vail chose at this time to put AT&T squarely behind government
regulation, as the quid pro quo for avoiding competition," explains
Richard Vietor. 123 "This was the only politically acceptable way for
AT&T to monopolize telephony," he notes.124 AT&T's 1917 annual
report confirms this fact, stating, with a "combination of like activities
under proper control and regulation, the service to the public would be
better, more progressive, efficient, and economical than competitive

systems."'

25

What sealed AT&T's lock on the communications marketplace,
however, was World War 1.126 On August 1, 1918, in the midst of the
War, the federal government nationalized the entire telecommunications
industry for national security reasons.127 AT&T executives were
119. Id.
120. BROCK, supra note 107, at 156 ("This provision allowed Bell and the independents to
exchange telephones in order to give each other geographical monopolies. So long as only one
company served a given geographical area there was little reason to expect price competition to
take place.").
121.

PETER W. HUBER ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 17 (2d ed. 1999).

122. See Wu, supra note 92, at 56 ("Superficially a victory for openness and competition,
in time the Kingsbury Commitment would prove the insidious death knell of both.").
123. VIETOR, supra note 52, at 171.
124. Id; see ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
BELL SYSTEM'S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876-1909, at 130 (1985) ("Regulation played a

crucial role in Vail's plans. Astute enough to realize that the kind of system he proposed-a
universal, integrated monopoly-would stand little chance of gaining public approval without
some form of public control, he embraced state regulation. In doing so, he broke with his
company's long-standing opposition to what [AT&T's] management had traditionally regarded
as an unwarranted intrusion on its prerogatives. But after years of unfettered competition, during
which the firm's financial strengths had been sapped and its efforts to build an integrated system
had been dangerously undermined, regulation became a much-preferred alternative."). Vail
obviously saw government regulation as the way to eliminate competitors: the one-way ticket,
not only to universal service, but also to monopoly profits.
125. Thierer, supra note 104, at 274.
126. Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment
with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War 1, 1009, 1012 (Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-14, 2012).
127.

See GEORGE P. OSLN, THE STORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 278 (1992).
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initially quite nervous when it was announced that Postmaster General
Albert S. Burleson, a longtime advocate of nationalizing the telegraph
and telephone industries, would assume control of the telephone
system.I28I However, once Vail was made aware of the benefits of
nationalization, his anxieties disappeared. George P. Oslin, an industry
historian, provides that when Vail expressed concern over the plan to
Newcomb Carlton, who was the president of Western Union and a close
personal friend, Carlton reassured Vail: "It's your salvation. The
government will be able to raise your rates and get you new money." 29
As Oslin summarized, "That was what happened. Burleson appointed
Vail, rated by Carlton as a enius, to manage the telephone, and Carlton
to operate the telegraph."
In his 1939 book AT&T: The Story of Industrial Conquest, Noobar
R. Danielian concurred: "There is evidence that Vail appreciated the
advantages of Federal control .

. .

. [H]e was not in much of a hurry in

the early part of 1919 to have his System back from nominal
government control."' 3' Vail's attitude should not be at all surprising.
Shortly after the industry was nationalized, the Postmaster General
accepted AT&T's proposed contract establishing the terms of
government ownership and compensation.132 The terms were highly
favorable to AT&T. "Of the estimated $50 million in rate increases
approved by the [P]ostmaster [G]eneral during nationalization,
approximately $42 million, or 84[%,] went to AT&T. Additionally, the
government cut AT&T a $13 million dollar check . . . to cover any
losses [the company] may have incurred, . . . [although] none were

evident."' Once the firm returned to private control following World
War I, regulators granted AT&T the sizable rate increases it
requested.
"The year of government nationalization was the [final] nail in the
coffin of [communications] competition,"' 35 and Congress basically
blessed the entire scheme in 1921 with the passage of the Graham Act.
This sad tale of corporatism only grew worse in subsequent years with
the initiation of extensive rate regulation and direct barriers to entry and
innovation.136 Rate regulation guaranteed AT&T stable returns and
ensured that regulators suddenly had a vested interest in keeping the
128.
129.
130.
131,

Id.
Id.
Id.
NOOBAR R. DANIELIAN, AT&T: THE STORY OF INDUSTRIAL CONQUEST 248 (1939).

132.
133.

See Thierer,supra note 104, at 275.
Id. at 276.

134.
135.

Id.
Id.

136.

Id. at 276-77.
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company healthy and protected from competition so that it could
achieve the industrial policy vision of "One Policy, One System
Universal Service," which had been the motto adopted by AT&T.
AT&T had so utterly captured legislators and regulators that its
corporate motto became the prime directive and modus operandi for all
century.13 8
half
next
the
over
policy
communications
Telecommunications policy considered ubiquitous network coverage to
be more important than competition and innovation, and AT&T's
monopoly was locked in for the next half century.
2. Local Cable Franchising
Cable television franchising is another area where cronyism has been
at work in the past. There are an estimated 34,000 franchise agreements
for the provision of cable television service.139 These agreements are
technical contracts between a cable provider and a city or other local
authority. 140 Courts have allowed cable franchises-despite their
inherently anticompetitive nature-under the assumption that cable
television provision is a natural monopoly and no more than one
provider is economically viable.141 In return for providing an operator
137. See id.; see also BROCK, supra note 107, at 159, 161 ("The combination of state and
federal regulation stabilized the industry and ended the rate wars that had occurred during the
early period of competition. Regulation increased the difficulty of new entry. . . . By accepting
regulation voluntarily, Bell reduced the risk that unfavorable regulation would be imposed. The
system of competing federal and state regulation, together with the complex Bell structure,
prevented real regulatory control while providing the protection and legitimacy of a regulated
utility.. . . The acceptance of regulation was a risk-reducing decision. It substituted a limited but
guaranteed return on capital and management freedom for the uncertainty of the marketplace. It
gave the Bell system a powerful weapon to.exclude competitors and justification for seeking a
monopoly, as well as reducing the chances of outright nationalization or serious antitrust
action.").
138. See Thierer, supra note 104, at 276-78.
139. Kent Lassman, Franchising in the Local Communications Market: A Primer and
Discussion of Three Questions, PROGRESS ON POINT: PERIODIC COMMENTARIES ON THE POLICY
DEBATE, June 2005, at 1, available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl2.9franch
ise.pdf.
140. Id
141. See, e.g., Cent. Telecomms., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 900-02
(1985) ("Since only one [cable] operator can survive in the market, it makes sense to allow the
local government to choose the best applicant."); see also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of
Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (1982) (indicating that the cable television system creates a
natural monopoly); see also Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378
(1981) (noting that "[i]nherent limitations on the number of speakers who can use a medium to
communicate has been given as a primary reason why extensive regulation of wireless
broadcasting is constitutionally permissible. . . . When such limitations exist, and the medium
requires use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain, the government must step in to
allocate entry into that medium."); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for
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with a franchise, cities could impose obligations relating to
geographical service (no cherry-picking of lucrative neighborhoods) and
rates. During the heyday of cable franchise agreements-the 1970s
and 1980s-applying for a franchise presented ample opportunities for
unseemly behavior by governments and by cable-franchise
applicants.143 Scandals were common, and several cable operators and
local politicians were caught in bribery schemes.144
City governments recognized decades ago that controlling cable
franchises was lucrative. In 1973, the New York City ma or called
cable licenses the "urban oil wells beneath our city streets."
In 1985,
during a sentencing hearing for a corruption case, a federal judge
commented, "I think what [the defendant] did was try to influence the
action of the mayor by offering him the opportunity to select somebody
who was going to get a fairly significant financial remuneration. I think
that's a bribe.

. .

. It's apparently what goes on in the cable industry all

1 46

the time."
In one case, the mayor of Johnstown, Pennsylvania and a
councilman plead guilty to requesting and receiving payments from the
president of a cable company that had applied for a cable franchise.147
The cable company president subsequently went to prison. 148 In another
case, a representative for a cable operator bribed the mayor of Fox
Lake, Illinois with a 5% interest in a subsidiary of the cable company,
an illegal payment valued at $250,000.149 A village trustee and others
involved in the kickback scheme were found guilty.150 In yet another
NaturalMonopolies-in Generaland with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). Aside
from the natural monopoly justification, franchising can be justified since laying cable occupies
public property and local rights-of-way. See, e.g., Cmty. Commc'ns Co., 660 F.2d at 1377.
142. See Lassman, supra note 139, at 1. Franchise agreements often functioned as granting
a cable company a local monopoly, but not always. Id. at 2 (noting that other video providers
such as satellite are still able to compete with cable franchise holders, eliminating franchise
holders full monopoly).
143. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchisesas Barriersto Video Competition, 12
VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 22 (2007).
144. The most famous case may be the scandal involving the convictions of Irving Kahn,
the president of TelePrompter, and the mayor and a councilman of Johnstown, New Jersey. See
United States v. Kahn, 340 F. Supp. 485, 488 (1971); see also United States v. Italiano, 837
F.2d 1480, 1481 (1988) (convicting a cable franchise applicant for bribing a Florida county
commissioner); United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 981 (1987) (involving a mayor, a cable
representative, and others caught in a substantial Illinois bribery case).
145. Albin Krebs, Cities Reassured on Cable-TV Rights; Impact Weighed Comments on
Investments Mayor Warns of Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1973, at 73 (demonstrating the city
mayor recognizing the value of cable franchising rights).
146. Lovett, 811 F.2d at 988.
147. Kahn, 340 F. Supp. at 488.
148. Id.
149. Lovett, 811 F.2d at 981.
150. Id.
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case, in Florida, a cable company gave money to several county
commissioners in a failed attempt to receive a cable franchise.' 5 ' The
bribery case led to the indictment of 25 people and 5 corporations.1 52
Many of these corruption cases involved the use of middlemen,
subsidiaries, and other ways of illegally seeking franchise approval. s3
Bribery, of course, is cronyism, but the more costly cronyism in
franchise agreements was the more common and legal kind.' Even
more harmful to competition and consumers were the barely legal
arrangements that occurred during this period.' 5 5 In practice, "cities
exercise the franchising power to extract services such as access
channels from cable companies in exchange for permission to use
public rights-of-way."l 56 A municipality would typically have a "needs
assessment" by a commission or consultant.1 57 Then, the city would
issue a request for proposals.158 City staff or consultants would evaluate
these proposals for their public benefits.159 Public hearings would be
held and determinations would be made about which cable provider
offered the most public benefits.1 60 The franchise-granting process took
many forms, and one cable scholar writes that determinations
[Riesultredi in opportunities for influence in arranging various
cross-subsidies, campaign contributions, lucrative private
employment for staff members, family members, or themselves,
illegal bribes, and legal bribes to friends or associates. These
legal bribes were routinized in the cable franchising "gold rush"
(from the late 1970s to the early 1980s). . . . [Clable operators

bidding for franchises would create local subsidiaries and
distribute a substantial minority equity interest to influential
community members. These stock holders would then lobby
municipal officials, receiving windfalls in the value of their
151.
152.
153.
1481.
154.

Id.
Italiano, 837 F.2d at 1481.
See, e.g., Kahn, 340 F. Supp. at 488; Lovett, 811 F.2d at 981; Italiano, 837 F.2d at
See PETER D. EDWARDS,

CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING: A CASE STUDY OF

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 29, 90 (1985) (describing how the political connections of franchise

applicants trumped the actual merits of their proposals resulting in inferior service).
155. See Hazlett, supra note 143, at 22 (describing legal practices used to influence
franchise decisions).
156. William E. Lee, Cable Franchisingand the FirstAmendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867,
868 (1983).
157. Hazlett, supra note 143, at 33.
158. See Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy ofFranchiseBidding Schemes in the Case of Cable
Television: Some Systematic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECON. 401, 402 (1989).
159. Id.
160. One study found that public interest commitments accounted for 11% of operating
costs and 26% of building costs for each franchised operator. Id. at 405.
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shares should their company receive a de facto exclusive cable

franchise.161
In the preferred legal method of persuading municipalities of the
public benefits of their cable systems, operators would offer prominent
local citizens discounted equity positions in their corporate stock with
the understanding that the benefited citizen would communicate the
benefits of the cable system to local leaders.16 2 One extensive case study
of Minneapolis in the 1980s found no illegality but a pernicious political
climate:
Indeed, the crucial factor in the Minneapolis cable franchise
decision was politics. The cable companies followed the pattern
which has become commonplace in cable franchise contests.
Each company went to considerable effort to align [itself|
favorably within the local political dynamic. Lawyers, lobbyists,
local investors, public relations firms and community groups
were all involved....
Local officials were only concerned marginally with [the]
rational assessment of design configurations, service offerings
and the enhancement of community life through the introduction
of an advanced telecommunications technology. Once judged as
adequate, proposals were viewed as equal, and politics became a
key element in the decision-making process.1 63
These efforts to limit competition in local markets severely distorted
the price and quality of video service.164 The blossoming competition
today clear! shows that the local cable agreements harmed
Today, video competition is driving down costs and
consumers.
expanding consumer options.1 66 Congress has prohibited exclusive
161.
162.
163.

Hazlett, supranote 143, at 22.
See id at 34.
Peter D. Edwards, Cable Television Franchising: A Case Study of Minneapolis,

Minnesota, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL, COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA CENTER 90, 94 (1985).

164. See Hazlett, supra note 143, at 80- 82 (describing how the restraint franchises impose
on competition results in higher prices and inferior service and increased competition results in
"lower prices and better service").
165. Id. at 81-82.
166. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found when satellite competed
with cable in the late 1990s, cable rates may increase, but that effect is accompanied by a
significant increase in the number of channels offered. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-00-164, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION FROM SATELLITE
PROVIDERS ON CABLE RATES 20 (2000). In that situation, the quality-adjusted price is lower. Id

("[S]ome key findings suggest that in response to DBS [direct broadcast satellite], cable
companies increased the quality of their services-in particular, the number of channels that
they offered consumers.").
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licensing since 1992,167 and cities can deny franchises as long as denial
is not "unreasonable."' 6 8 Satellite firms, DirecTV, and DISH Network
provide competition, as do cable "overbuilders" (cable companies
entering markets in areas previously served only by cable franchisees)
and telecommunications operators (telcos), which are an increasingly
As recently as 2006, telcos
competitive threat to cable companies.
offering video services were available to only 5% of households, 7 0 yet
telcos' effect on consumer prices was significant.171 In the early 2000s,
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the
presence of a telco or other wire-based video competitor lowered cable
rates by about 15%.172 Beginning in earnest in 2005, telcos like AT&T
and Verizon pressured state legislatures to ease barriers;173 and today at
least 25 states have adopted statewide cable franchising, overriding the
ability of local governments to grant franchises.1 74 By 2010, AT&T's
U-Verse and Verizon's FiOS were available to approximately 33% of
households,17 5 providing a substantial check on cable company market
power in many areas. 176 These favorable developments should
continue-resulting in lower quality-adjusted prices and more
competitive options-and correct the consumer harms caused by
167. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
168. Id. sec. 7, § 621(a)(4). In practice, however, one scholar noted that the franchising
process creates de facto exclusive licensing. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competitionin
Cable Television: Implicationsfor Public Policy, 7 YALE J. REG. 65, 69-70 (1990).
169. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8626 (2012) [hereinafter FCC Video Competition
Report] (describing the companies and competition in the cable marketplace).
170. Id. at 8624.
171.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-08, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ISSUES

RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY 3 (2003)

[hereinafter COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES] (describing the effect that the presence of

Telcos had on cable prices).
172. Id
173. James G. Parker, Note, Statewide Cable Franchising:Expand Nationwide or Cut the
Cord?, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 199, 206-10 (2011).
174.

See

DIGITAL POLICY

INST.,

TELECOMMUNICATION

DEREGULATION:

A

POLICY

PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://cms.bsu.edu/-/media/WWWIDepartmental
Content/DPI/PDFs/TelecommDeregulation.pdf.
175. FCC Video Competition Report, 27 FCC Rcd. at 8624-26 ("In 2006, facilities-based
telephone MVPD service was available to approximately six million homes (4.7 percent). By
2010, telephone MVPD service had become available to 42.9 million homes (32.8 percent).").
176. Further liberalization may have been accelerated by a 2007 FCC order. See
Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as
amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 22 FCC
Rcd. 5101, 5102 (2007); see also Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 766-67 (6th
Cir. 2008) (indicating that the FCC acted within its authority by ordering the adoption of rules
interpreting and implementing section 621(a)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934).
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exclusive franchising.1 77
3. Universal Service Subsidies
AT&T strategically used the social goal of "universal
communications service" to coax polic'makers into giving the company
greater control and generous returns.1 It solidified the firm's grasp of
telecom markets for well over half of a century.' 79 With the 1984
breakup of AT&T and the resulting competition, AT&T could no longer
afford to subsidize its high-cost rural customers with its profitable urban
customers. 80 Lawmakers eventually responded by creating a system of
"access charges" and, later, the current federal subsidy system, which is
funded by the Universal Service Fund (USF).' 8 ' The USF was plagued
by inefficiencies from the start and the subsidies distort the entire
telephone market; however, firms that have built business models
reliant on the subsidy system restrict reform. 82
The USF was established to help ensure low-priced and reasonable
telephone bills are available for all Americans.183 Every month,
consumers of phone services pay a fee to their service providers, usually
called the "federal universal service charge."' 84 In 2013, this fee
accounted for more than 15% of service providers' long-distance
revenues.
Telephone companies collect several billions of dollars
each year from consumers in this way and remit the proceeds to the
USF, which are distributed to various programs.' 86 The largest portion
of the USF goes to high-cost areas-that is, to rural carriers, because
rural service is much more costly to provide.
In 2002, the GAO
estimated that providing rural service cost nearly 3 times as much as
177.

COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER RATES, supra note 171, at 3.

178.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-187, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FEDERAL

AND STATE UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS AND CHALLENGES TO FUNDING 2 (2002) [hereinafter
UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS].

179. Id.
180. Id. at 3.
18 1. Id.
182. See Sanford V. Berg et al., Universal Service Subsidies and Cost Overstatement:
Evidence From the U S. Telecommunications Sector, 35 TELECOMM. POL'Y 583, 584 (2011).
183. Id. at 583.
184. This is not a tax found in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, but rather a fee passed on
to consumers since carriers are encouraged by the FCC to commit a portion of their revenue to
the USF. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(4).
185. Proposed Second Quarter 2013 Universal Service Contribution Factor, 28 FCC Rcd. 2484,
2484-87 (2013).
186. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-633, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC
NEEDS TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF THE HIGH-

COST PROGRAM 8 (2008) [hereinafter FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM].

187. Id
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providing service in metropolitan areas. 8 8
Because of the way the USF system is structured-with subsidies
being delivered through carriers instead of directly to individualswaste is common and the telecom market is severely distorted,
particularly for rural carriers. 89 While the USF's political objectives are
laudable, the federal programs suffer from a lack of adequate oversight
(from either Congress or the FCC) and from a payment system that
invites abuse, specifically, the rate-of-return payment.' 90
The federal USF includes 4 divisions: (1) high-cost carriers,19 1 (2)
low-income households, (3) schools and libraries, and (4) rural healthcare providers.' 92 Of these, the high-cost carrier division is the most
expensive,193 and because of carriers' reliance on it, it is the most
problematic division to reform.' 94 As economist Thomas Hazlett stated
in his 2006 review of the USF and the high-cost beneficiaries, "Rural
telephone companies have, in fact, gained a reputation among
economists as the highly inefficient creatures of regulatory desig."9
Since 1986, more than $48 billion has gone to high-cost support.
High-cost support includes "rate of return" regulation that guarantees
incumbent rural carriers an 11.25% return on network investments.' 9 7 In
2009, rate-of-return carriers received $2 billion in support. 198 Because
the high-cost fund subsidizes carriers based on their costs, firms face a

188.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS, supra note 178, at 15.

189. See Berg et al., supra note 182, at 584.
190. The FCC diminished its reliance on rate of return carriers for USF purposes in its
2011 USF reform order, but this payment system still exists. See Connect America Fund; A
National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local
Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support; Developing an Unified Intercarrier
Compensation Regime; Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; Lifeline and Link-Up;
Universal Service Reform-Mobility Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17674 (2011) [hereinafter
High-Cost Universal Service Support].
191. The high-cost division directly and indirectly supports services including basic
telephone service, broadband service, and wireless service. See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM,

supra note 186, at 20.
192. This includes the Link-Up and Lifeline programs. See SCorr WALLSTEN, TECH.
POLICY INST., THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND, WHAT Do HIGH-COST SUBSIDIES SUBSIDIZE? 6

n.18 (2011), available at http://techpolicyinstitute.org/files/wallsten%20universal-service
money trail final.pdf.
193. Id at 6.
194. Id. at 15-16.
195.

THOMAS

W.

HAZLETT,

ARLINGTON

ECON.,"UNIVERSAL

SERVICE"

TELEPHONE

SUBSIDIES: WHAT DOES $7 BILLION Buy? 33 (2006), available at http://www.arlington

economics.com/studies/whatdoes7billion buy.pdf (citation omitted).
196. Figure not adjusted for inflation. WALLSTEN, supra note 192, at 6.
197. Id. at 34.
198. Figure based on USAC preliminary 2009 disbursement data. See High-Cost Universal
Service Support, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17674 (2011).
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perverse incentive to maximize expenditures.199 Put differently, for a
high-cost carrier, the higher its actual costs, the more USF funding it
receives.200 In addition to some high-profile cases of outright fraud in
the high-cost subsidy program, 20 there is empirical evidence that
hundreds of carriers-those with costs approaching the level where
subsidies kick in-systematically inflate or misreport costs.202
Economist Scott Wallsten estimated in 2011 that for every dollar of
subsidy to high-cost incumbent phone carriers, nearly 60 cents went to
an increase in personnel, administrative, and general expenses. 203
John Stanton, former CEO of a rural cellular provider, called the
subsidies "an incentive for abuse,"204 and the National Broadband Plan
reported that "current oversight of the specific uses of High-Cost
support is limited." 205 Mean and median payments per phone line were
$649 and $361 in 2008,206 but some firms receive as much as a $20,000
subsidy per year per line. 207 USA Today reported on a Texas firm that
had 6000 customers and an astonishing $3.6 million in corporate
overhead costs. 20 8 Tales like these are common. 209 An Oklahoma carrier
was subsidized to the tune of $1.6 million to provide service to 246
lines-even though all its customers had wireless coverage from
AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint. 2 10 Weavtel, a Washington State company
that serviced 14-17 lines in the mountains, received around $700,000

199.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 17.

200. Id.
201. CassTel was a rural Missouri phone company used by Mafia affiliates to receive $8.9
million in fraudulent overpayments, including $3.5 million from universal service funds. See,
e.g., Mike Brunker, Alleged Mobsters Guilty in Vast Net, Phone Fraud,NBCNEWS (Feb. 15,
2005, 11:40 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6928696/ns/usnews-crime-and-courts/t/
alleged-mobsters-guilty-vast-net-phone-fraud/#.UKAmpK7ZGSo; see also United States v.
Matzdorff, Case No. 05-00020-CR-W-SOW, Plea Agreement (W.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2005).
202. See Berg et al., supra note 182, at 589.
203.

WALLSTEN, supra note 192, at 3.

204. Paul Davidson, Fees Paidby All Phone Customers Help Rural Phone Firms Prosper,
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2004, 11:48 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/
telecom/2004-11-15-rural-phone-feesx.htm.
205.

FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN

141-42, available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-chapter-8availability.pdf.
206. WALLSTEN, supra note 192, at 12-13 fig.8.
207. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Proposes Modernizing and
Streamlining Universal Service (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs
public/attachmatch/DOC-304522A l.pdf.
208. See Davidson, supra note 204.
209. Id.
210. Nate Anderson, Rural Telco Serves 17 People, Rakes in $300K (of Your Money), ARS
TECHNICA (July 12, 2010, 2:07 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/07/rural-telcoserves-I 7-people-rakes-in-3 00k-of-your-money/.

2013]

A HISTORY OF CRONYISMAND CAPTURE IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECTOR

159

211

over 3 years.
The USF and especially the high-cost programs are rife with
overpayment and abuse,212 which is why the FCC has attempted to
reform the USF for years. 2 13 Despite these abuses, from 2002-2008, the
Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), the administrator
of the USF proram, completed only 17 audits of more than 1400
eligible carriers.
The composition of USAC's board of directors undermines the
notion that it can provide competent oversight.2 1 5 USAC is a nonprofit
subsidiary of the National Exchange Carrier Association (NECA),
which was originally created by telecom companies in the 1980s to
administer access charges. 2 16 NECA's affiliation with the USF's
administrator indicates how intimately industry is involved in the
process.217 NECA's board is separate from USAC's board, 2 18 but
USAC's board composition does not inspire confidence in aggressive
oversight of disbursement. Of USAC's 19 board members, only 2 are
nominated by consumer groups.219 Nine of the remaining directors are
nominated by industry goups, and they are appointed after approval
from the FCC chairman.
The idea that a board of directors, composed of individual directors
nominated largely by the industry receiving disbursements, will be an
effective auditor strains credulity. The very rare audits and the
documented waste indicate that the USF system is seriously flawed.2 2'
Because of the lax state and federal oversight and a disproportionately
rural national legislature, rural phone carriers have formed a powerful
political force that resists reform of the universal service programs they
are enriched by. 222 In the quarterly newsletter for what was then called
the Rural Cellular Association, Representative Don Young (R-AK)
noted, "[t]he more carriers engage with both their Representatives and
Senators (on USF matters), the better. While the early bird may get the
211.

Id.

212.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 6.

213.
214.
215.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9; see also 47 C.F.R.

216.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 9.

§ 54.703(b)(l)-(6) (2013).

217. Id. at 9-10.
218. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.703(a).
219. See id. § 54.703(b)(10)-(12). One director represents low-income consumers, while
another represents state consumer advocates. Id.
220. Id. § 54.703(c).
221.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 6.

222. See Grant Gross, Rural CarriersProtestFCC Telephone Subsidy Reform, PC WORLD
(July 6, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/258890/rural-carriersprotestfcc
telephone subsidyreform.html.
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worm, the bird that doesn't even try definitely won't get any worms.
The same applies to Congress."223 When the FCC enacted a cap on
high-cost subsidies in the summer of 2012 the industry instantly
214
enlisted members of Congress to fight the cap.
The USF threatens to distort the wireless market in the same way
that it distorts the wired market.225 Americans have grown more
dependent on mobile phone service in the past few years, and recent
growth in the high-cost progam derives from wireless companies'
increasing use of USF funds.2 6 Nationwide carriers Verizon and AT&T
account for much of this growth, as they receive tens of millions of
dollars every year from the USF and use much of that money for their
wireless networks.2 27 Unfortunately, much of the subsidies to wireless
companies merely duplicate service that already exists.228 As Hank
Hultquist, a vice president of AT&T's federal regulatory affairs, put it
"[i]t's almost as if the FCC put out a sign saying get dollars here."223
Derek Turner at Free Press notes that "[s]ome areas have as many as 19
carriers serving [them] with USF funds."23 0 Similarly, reporters found
that an area in Mississippi has 15 competing carriers receiving USF
funds, and an Alabama area has 12 subsidized carriers competing.
As the FCC shifts USF funds from voice service to broadband
network penetration and creates a broadband program, 23 2 it is
imperative that policymakers avoid guaranteed profits through rate-ofreturn regulation and other policies that predictably enrich interest
groups. Legislators, when considering a universal service law in the
1990s, believed the USF would increase competition, thereby
decreasing or eliminating the need for universal service support.2 3 3 It is
perverse that the program support has exploded, and some areas see

223. Congressional Spotlight, Congressman Don Young (R-AK), RCA VOICE
(Spring/Summer 2012), http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/RCABO12/index.php#/50.
224. See Gross, supra note 222.
225.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 4.

226. Id. at 4-5.
227. See Cecilia Kang, AT&T, Verizon Get Most Federal Aid for Phone Service, WASH.
POST (July 8, 2010, 5:31 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/attverizon
get mostfederala.html.
228. See Joan Engebretson, How AT&T Exec Defends Universal Service Funds,
CONNECTED PLANET ONLINE (Aug. 5, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://connectedplanetonline.com/

commentary/att-defends-usf-0805 10/.
229. Id.
230. See Kang, supra note 227.
231.

Joan Engebretson, The Real Story on the Latest USF Data, CONNECTED PLANET

ONLINE (July 15, 2010, 11:01 AM), http://connected planetonline.com/commentary/real-storyusf-data-071510/.
232. See High-Cost Universal Service Support, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17667 (2011).
233. See S.REP.No. 104-23, at 26 (1995).

2013]

A HISTORY OF CRONYISMAND CAPTURE IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYSECTOR

161

more than a dozen phone companies competing.23 4 All the while, the
GAO has said it is unclear that telephone and broadband subsidies
funded through the USF sinificantly improve penetration, competition,
or economic development. What is clear is that these subsidies have
created a powerful group of subsidy-dependent carriers and have made
it tough to sensibly reform the programs. The USF proceedings serve as
a powerful example of Mancur Olson's observation that when benefits
are concentrated and costs are dispersed (across all telephone ratepayers
in this case), powerful constituencies will develop to secure those
benefits. 236
C. Spectrum Policy and BroadcastIndustry Regulation
This Part III.C discusses the origins of spectrum regulation in the
United States and outlines how government-granted privileges were
present from the start. This history also shows how one sector in
particular-FCC-licensed
TV
broadcasters-benefited
from
government-accorded privileges during the digital television transition
and in ongoing "retransmission consent" negotiations.
Sadly, rent-seeking and rent extraction have proven to be regular
fixtures in this field. "What distinguishes TV programs from other mass
media content, including both traditional print and new online media,"
observes Bruce Owen, "is the extreme eagerness of Washington to
engage in efforts to prevent markets from working freely, often in
response to interest group pressures and opportunities for political
advantage and with almost complete indifference to the welfare of
consumers." 237
1. The Cronyist Origins of Spectrum Licensing
In his important 1990 study on "The Rationality of U.S. Regulation
of the Broadcast Spectrum," Thomas Hazlett-expanding on Coase's
property rights work238-pointed out that property rights in spectrum
were beginning to develop naturally through common law cases in the

234.

See Engebretson,supra note 231.

235.

See FCC HIGH-COST PROGRAM, supra note 186, at 4 (explaining that since larger

carriers are typically exempt from USF funds, they may abandon a rural area for a subsidized
competitor or fail to upgrade its network).
236.

See OLSON, JR., supra note 67.

237.

BRUCE

M.

OWEN,

MERCATUS

CTR.,

CONSUMER WELFARE

AND TV

PROGRAM

REGULATION 5 (2012), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/consumer-welfare-and-tvprogram-regulation.
238. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1959).
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1920s. 239 Such a regime could have solved interference claims without
resorting to onerous administrative regulation. 24 0 ,Private rights in the
ether under common law were immediately recognized as a solution to
the interference problem," Hazlett revealed, and a "homesteading
principle" could have taken hold to deal with interference claims in a
bottom-up, organic fashion.2 4 1
Unfortunately, federal officials and incumbent spectrum holders
conspired to head off this market-oriented solution. Regulation was later
justified as a way to alleviate spectrum "chaos," or interference, 242 but,
as Hazlett explained, "a careful examination of the early radio
broadcasting market and the legislative history of the Federal Radio Act
of 1927 reveals that [the] . . . licensing standard was a compromise

designed to generate significant rents for each constituency in the
process."24 3 Regulation was really a way to avoid the rigors of
competition through strict rationing of spectrum via a licensing system.
Enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 "immediately grandfathered
rights for major broadcasters, while eliminating marginal competitors
and all new entry," Hazlett notes. 244 Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber have
also pointed out the anticompetitive nature of the Radio Act, noting that
"[a] gentlemanly agreement, reached under political pressure, had once
again replaced competition with complementary monopolies," and that
"Congress merely cemented and strengthened a division of markets and
territories that the parties had already voluntarily embraced." 245
In this advent of radio, it is nearly impossible to distinguish the
industry's desires from the government's. In the fourth National Radio
Conference in 1925, Secretary Herbert C. Hoover proclaimed his
support for a "public interest" standard in allocating radio licenses.246 At
the same conference, the National Association of Broadcasters
presented its resolution "that in any [C]ongressional legislation .. . the

test of the broadcasting privilege [will] be based upon the needs of the
public. . . . The basis should be convenience and necessity."247 The

broadcasters seemed enamored with their potential regulator:
239. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum,
33 J.L. & EcoN. 133, 139-42 (1990).
240. Id. at 143.
241. Id. at 151.
242. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943); see also Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
243. Hazlett, supra note 239, at 134.
244. Id. at 154.
245. HUBER, ET AL., supra note 121, at 19, 20.
246. Radio Control, Hearing on S. 1 and S. 1754 Before the Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 69th Cong. 50-58 (1926) [hereinafter Radio Controlj (statement of Herbert C.
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce).
247. Id. at 59.
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[T]he members of this conference express to the Secretary their
appreciation of this opportunity for offering their suggestions and
pledge him their best efforts to help carry out the various
provisions thereof . . . [and] the members assure him of their

hearty approval and cooperation in any individual deviations
from these provisions if, in his judgment, greater service may be

rendered thereby. 248
They had little reason to fear. The senator who helped author the
1927 law explained that the public interest standard enshrined in the law
actually originated from the industry itself in the 1925 conference. 2 49 in
return, Congress had the ability to control this powerful new
entertainment and news medium.
The new powers found in the act
were eventually folded into the Communications Act of 1934,251 and the
FCC was then fully entrenched as the nation's spectrum central planner.
The magnanimous relationship between regulator and industry was
not a relic of simpler times; instead, Hazlett points out, this close
relationship developed because the radio market was becoming dynamic
and competitive and the major broadcasters sought to exclude rivals.2 52
In the mid-1920s, radio technology expanded the available spectrum
and the ability of the major broadcasters to extract rents was
diminishing. 253 With no way to exclude rivals through competitive
means, and after losing in the state courts, the industry's major players
turned to Hoover. 254 Hoover, for years, had sought to bring broadcasts
under federal control. With the industry's support-which was
encouraged by Hoover's intentional negligence in policing the
airwaves-he was finally able to gain momentum for legislation. 5 In
the run-up to the passage of the 1927 Radio Act, Morris Ernst, cofounder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), wrote, "[t]he
proposed legislation contains phrases such as 'public utility,' 'public
necessity,' and 'public interest,' but the operation of the bill is for
private profit and for stabilization of investment." 256
After passage of the 1927 law, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
248.

Id. at 61.

249.

See CLARENCE C. DILL, RADIO LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 89 (1938).

250. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave AllocationPolicy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335, 352 (2001).
251. Id. at 376.
252. See Hazlett, supra note 239, at 153.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Thomas W. Hazlett, PhysicalScarcity, Rent Seeking, and the FirstAmendment,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 922 (1997).

256.

Morris Ernst, Who Shall Control the Air?, 122 NATION 443, 444 (1926).
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evidently agreed with the industry that there were "excess [sic]
stations," 257 declined to require broadcast-sharing agreements, and
declined to widen the broadcast band.2 58 The decision to make broadcast
spectrum artificially scarce (hence, more valuable for existing
broadcasters) was supported by the industry's specious claim that more
radio stations harmed consumers since more stations would require
listeners to purchase new radio sets. 25 9 Further, the FRC defined "public
interest" in ways that systematically excluded smaller competitors and
entrants through capital requirements, advanced technology
requirements, and requirements to broadcast continuously. 26 0 These
regulations were devastating for nonprofit, educational, and small radio
operators, as many folded. 61 A few years later, a popular business
journal summarized the unholy alliance between the state and industry,
as follows: "While talking in terms of the public interest, convenience,
and necessity the commission actually chose to further the ends of the
commercial broadcasters. They form the substantive content of public
interest as interpreted by the Commission."262 With the passage of the
1927 Radio Act, broadcast licenses were zero-priced and allocated to
those firms that could show they were operating in the public interest. 263
Commercial broadcasters had their prize--exclusion of rivals-and
Congress and regulators had theirs-a pliant media and a hupely
influential bargaining chip with which to increase political power.26
257.

Welcome to the Radio Commission, 10 RADIO BROADCAST 555 (1927).

258. Hazlett, supra note 239, at 155.
259. Id. at 155-56. See also OWEN, supra note 237, at 9 ("In making spectrum allocation
decisions, the FCC has been heavily influenced by industry interests, both directly and through
congressional patrons of the broadcast and broader entertainment industries. For example, for
decades the FCC made first radio and then TV licenses artificially scarce to protect the
economic interests of broadcast networks and big-city stations. The evidence for this is found in
the extremely high prices at which broadcast licenses were bought and sold, reflecting the
capitalization of scarcity rents. This artificial scarcity of a crucial input to broadcasting resulted
in massive losses of consumer welfare.").
260.

See PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS

AND THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1920-1934, at 133 (1980).

261.

See Hazlett, supra note 239, at 166, 169.

262. ERIK BARNOuw, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN
BABEL 219 (1966).

263. See Hazlett, supra note 239, at 135.
264. See Hazlett, supra note 250, at 357; Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Digital Television and the Quid Pro Quo, 2 Bus. & POL. 115, 118-19 (2000). Other scholars
note,
The 1927 Act was a quantum leap in regulation. Congress did not content itself
with curbing interference among users of the spectrum, but instead included in
the new Act provisions relating to programming, licensing and renewal, and
many other aspects of broadcasting not related to electronic interference. Those
provisions were incorporated seven years later into the Communications Act of
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2. The HDTV Giveaway
As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the broadcast
industry effectively used its lobbying muscle to secure tens of billions
of dollars worth of valuable spectrum in the name of assisting its
transition to digital television.2 5 High-definition television (HDTV),
digital television that requires substantial amounts of spectrum to
display excellent picture quality on TV sets, was a catchphrase
broadcasters began using in the late 1980s to convince regulators to
reserve valuable parcels of spectrum for the future development of this
new technology. 6 Other companies asked the FCC to give them the
chance to use that spectrum for alternative wireless services, but
broadcasters persuaded policymakers to set aside large swaths of
spectrum for their future HDTV needs. 267
Each broadcaster already had a 6-megahertz (MHz) spectrum
allocation that it used to provide consumers with old-fashioned analog
268
TV signals. Huge portions of TV broadcast spectrum, however, were
unused or underutilized because the higher frequencies had poor signal
propagation characteristics.269 Other wireless service providers, like
paging providers and two-way radio providers, saw this valuable
resource lying relatively fallow.2To Not facing the technical propagation
problems that plagued video broadcasting, they petitioned the FCC to
reallocate some of the unused broadcast spectrum for their services. 2 71
In response, broadcasters made the case for transitioning their analog
signal to high-quality HDTV.27 2 Because transitioning to HDTV was for
public benefit, broadcasters argued,27 3 they would need the government
to "loan" them that vacant spectrum-6 MHz for every channel-to
simulcast digital signals alongside their analog broadcasts until
Americans made the complete transition to HDTV sets.27 4 Once enough
1934.
Anne P. Jones & Harry W. Quillan, Broadcasting-Regulation:A Very Brief History, 37 FED.
COMM. L.J. 107, 107 (1985) (footnotes omitted).

265.
266.

See Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 264, at 130-31.
Id at 124-26.

267. See generally JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: How BROADCASTERS LURED THE
GOVERNMENT INTO INCITING A REVOLUTION INTELEVISION 1 (1997).

268.
269.

See Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 264, at 122.
Id at 122-24 (stating ultra-high frequency (UHF) was a poor transmitter of TV

broadcast signals, and for that reason largely went unused).

270. Id. at 124.
271. Id
272. Id
273. See generally id at 125-35 (presenting a number of rationales for broadcasters
holding on to bandwidth spectrum).
274. Id at 124.
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households had transitioned to the new digital spectrum, the
broadcasters would hand back their old 6-MHz analog licenses, or so
the theory went. 275 There was an additional catch associated with the
broadcasters' scheme: They did not want to pay anything for the new
spectrum. Broadcasters argued that it would be unfair to make them pay
anything for the new spectrum since they were providing a new service
to the public and the HDTV transition was going to be expensive for the
industry.
Despite bipartisan opposition to the giveaway of such valuable
spectrum and the existence of many other spectrum users eager to bid
billions to obtain that same spectrum for other uses, the broadcast
industry's formidable lobbying proved too powerful to overcome and
Congress signed off on the scheme as part of the Telecom Act. 276
Additionally, in August 2002, the FCC mandated that television-set
manufacturers include digital television tuners in all of their new sets by
2007 to help facilitate the transition even though the DTV tuners were
initially estimated to add approximately $200 to the cost of each new
television.2 77
Of course, as some critics pointed out in the early 1990s when this
issue was debated, the opportunity costs of this scheme were quite
high. 278 The spectrum that the broadcasters were asking for could have
been auctioned off immediately for alternative uses instead of waiting
years (perhaps even decades) for the old licenses to be returned for
auction. If that spectrum had been auctioned promptly, it would have
generated tens of billions of dollars for federal coffers immediately;
there would have been no need to wait years for the broadcasters to
vacate their analog channels.2 7 9 Economist Coleman Bazelon estimated
that the social value of the spectrum was substantially more-$233

billion to $473 billion.2 8 0
Why would lawmakers support such a blatant giveaway of a
275. See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and BridgingDivides: The Failureand
Redemption ofAmerican Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 1, 44-45
(2004).
276. See Angela J. Campbell, A Public Interest Perspective on the Impact of the
Broadcasting Provisions of the 1996 Act, 58 FED. CoMM. L.J. 455, 457-58 (2006); Varona,
supra note 275, at 85.
277. Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital
Television, 17 FCC Rcd. 15978 (2002).
278. See Denise Ulloa, Advanced Television Systems: A Reexamination of Broadcasters'
Use of the Spectrumfrom A Twenty-First Century Perspective, 16 WHITTFIER L. REV. 1155, 1180
(1995).
279. See Heather Forsgren Weaver, Intel Study: 700 MHz Spectrum Worth $233B in Social
Benefits, RCRWIRELESS (June 3, 2005), http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20050603/sub/intelstudy-700-mhz-spectrum-worth-233b-in-social-benefits/.
280. Id.
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valuable resource? The broadcasters' aforementioned lobbying prowess
is certainly one possible explanation. Television broadcasters are a
powerful force in nearly every congressional district, and even though
Republicans have not traditionally had a good relationship with the
media, they still must deal with them both at home and in
Washington. 281 Further, spectrum incumbents know that the public
interest standard by which the FCC judges spectrum allocations is
highly elastic. 282 Since incumbents enjoy rents thanks to licensing
restrictions on entrants, incumbents like broadcasters can divert some
profits toward politically popular programs and point to those efforts
when the FCC or legislators threaten the status quo.283
Another explanation is less cynical in nature. Many lawmakers stress
the importance of continuing free, over-the-air local broadcasting as a
vital public service regardless of the cost of doing so. 284Many
lawmakers still view broadcast television as a birthright entitlement for
Americans, even though just 9% of U.S. households rely exclusively on
over-the-air broadcast TV service today.285 Thus, schemes like the DTV
transition are tolerated in the name of universal television service for the
increasingly small percentage of homes that do not subscribe to cable or
satellite TV.
Regardless of the rationale for it, the opportunity costs associated
with this giveaway were staggering and continue today. Many other
wireless companies were denied the opportunity to use that same
spectrum for alternative services that the public might actually demand.
Wireless broadband providers, for example, could use this same
spectrum to provide millions of American households with a high-speed
Internet connection. Nonetheless, policymakers, egged on by the
broadcast lobby, sheltered broadcasters from those market pressures.
3. Modem Video Marketplace Regulation
Other forms of government-granted privilege pervade the video
marketplace and, once again, most of those privileges favor broadcast
interests.
Even as viewing options from new sources have multiplied in recent
decades, America's traditional video marketplace-broadcast television,
281.

See generally J.H. SNIDER, SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A BIG STICK: How LOCAL TV

BROADCASTERS EXERT POLITICAL POWER (2005).

282. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S. Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte
Switch 23 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001),
availableat http://mason.gmu.edu/-thazlett/pubs/Digital%20TV%20Transition.php.
283. Id.
284. See FCC Video Competition Report, supranote 169, at 8683-84.
285. Id. at 8701 tbl.15.
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cable TV, and satellite TV-has remained encumbered with many
layers of federal regulation. This system prevents the development of a
truly free market in video programming and simultaneously threatens to
extend old regulations to new online platforms and services. 28 6
Among the rules that persist are a requirement that cable TV
distributors carry broadcast signals even if they do not want to ("must
carry" rule); rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with
broadcasters outside their local communities ("network nonduplication"
and "syndicated exclusivity" rules); regulations specifying where
broadcast channels appear on the cable channel lineup; and prohibitions
against carrying sporting events on cable when the local stadium does
not sell all of its seats on game day ("sports blackout" rules).28 7 In
addition, a hodgepodge of media ownership rules artificially limit
marketplace transactions.2 88
Most of these rules provide an advantage for broadcast-television
license holders and content conanies, and those interests fight
vociferously for their retention. 9 In particular, those interests
aggressively defend "retransmission consent" or "retrans" rules, which
were put in place as part of the Cable Act of 1992 and govern how
video distributors carry signals from local TV broadcasters.2 90 These
rules let the FCC oversee the contractual negotiations, which are often
highly contentious.291 Signal blackouts sometimes occur when parties
cannot reach a deal, although that outcome is rare.292
Broadcasters and most content companies oppose any effort to
reform these rules because the current retransmission consent regulatory
regime provides them with stable (and rapidly increasing) compensation
for their programming.2 93 Broadcasters say the current system
represents a decent proxy for actual free-market negotiations and that
the current rule and other corresponding regulations are needed to
preserve broadcasting's
uniquely important role in local
286. See Adam Thierer, Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming,FORBES
(Feb. 19, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/02/19/toward-a-truefree-market-in-television-programming.
287. Id.
28 8. Id.
289. See Jimmy Schaeffler, Balancing Retransmission:And the Data Says... Advantage
Broadcasters,MULTICHANNEL NEWS (July 16, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/

blog/Mixed Signals/33463-Balancing RetransmissionAndTheDataSaysAdvantageBro
adcasters.php.
290.

RANDOLPH

J. MAY,

FREE

STATE

FOUNDATION,

BROADCAST

RETRANSMISSION

NEGOTIATIONS AND FREE MARKETS 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.freestatefoundation.org/

images/BroadcastRetransmission ConsentNegotiationsand FreeMarkets_101610.pdf.
291. See Thierer,supra note 286.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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communities.294 However, it is precisely because of these rules that
there is little evidence what the actual market value of programming is.
Cable and satellite television distributors strongly oppose the retrans
regime and the other rules listed previously, which they claim favor
broadcasters and content companies.295 They are correct. Unfortunately,
however, other rules exist that favor these video distributors. Video
content transactions are governed by the compulsory licensing
requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a
"duty to deal" upon content owners to the benefit of video
distributors.296 This requirement means content owners are not able to
determine the actual market value of their programming through normal
contractual negotiations.
As a result of all of these overlapping rules, rent protection is alive
and well in America's video marketplace since everyone has regulations
they want preserved. Parties on all sides of this debate keep finding
reasons to maintain or extend the status quo in an attempt to keep the
government tilting the playing field in their preferred direction, even
though no good economic or social reason exists to continue the
rules. 297 In 2012, two congressional lawmakers introduced a proposal
that would abolish these rules, but the law did not garner any additional
support and was never seriously considered. 298 Deregulation of these
rules may prove difficult since few policymakers seem willing to
embrace a truly free-market future for the video marketplace. 299
IV. CREEPING CRONYISM IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

This Part IV investigates how cronyism could spread to new
information sectors. First, Part IV considers the growing presence of
high-tech firms inside Washington and the rapid expansion of their
294. Id
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See OWEN, supra note 237, at 19-20 ("It is past time to stop extending interventions
originally intended for old technology (broadcasting) to a range of new competitive media. . . .
No longer is there any rational public policy basis for a government agency ... to dictate how
much or what content the viewing public can see, any more than there ever has been for printed
media. There is no market failure to which the current regulatory framework is responsive.").
298. Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) and Representative Steve Scalise (R-LA) introduced
"The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act" in the 112th Congress. H.R. 3675, 112th
Cong. (2011). The Act proposed comprehensive deregulation of all of these video marketplace
rules but received very little support. Id.; see Adam Thierer, Continuing Confusion in the
Debate Over Retrans & Video Marketplace Deregulation, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 29,

2012),
http://techliberation.com/2012/03/29/continuing-confusion-in-the-debate-over-retransvideo-marketplace-deregulation.
299. See id
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lobbying activities in Washington. Then, Part IV examines examples of
how favoritism has already been shown to specific firms or tech sectors.
A. Increases in FederalTech Spending and Lobbying
Will rent-seeking become as big of a problem in the digital age as it
was in the analog era? If the growing presence of technology companies
in Washington is any indication, the signs are not encouraging. "Silicon
Valley has long prided itself on avoiding the lumbering relationship
between big government and most industries, but somehow it has
become one of the top lobbyists in Washington," notes L. Gordon
Crovitz, a Wall Street Journalcolumnist. 300
Information technology companies have gradually increased their
presence not just in Washington but also in state capitals, while
simultaneously increasing their overall campaign contributions at both
levels. 30 1 Agency-level lobbying continues to grow as well. "Lobbying
the FCC has become a major economic franchise," reports the
Washington Post.302 "Each day, hundreds of dark-suited lawyers crowd
the antiseptic, midcentury-modern agency building."303
Certainly, lobbying is not always rent-seeking. Lobbying activity can
provide useful information to legislators and regulators, as well as to
journalists and the broader public. However, lobbying is frequently used
as a sword against competitors or to gain regulatory advantages
impossible to attain in the market. It is difficult to distinguish "good"
lobbying from rent-seeking, but because lobbying creates an arms race
among competitors, increased presence in Washington D.C. is typically
a bad sign for competition and consumers. The fact that technology and
information economy companies participate more in politics and
regulation in recent years is particularly concerning since it could sap
the entrepreneurial spirit and competition in this innovative sector.
Digital economy innovators have produced an impressive array of hightech goods and services over the past 15 years, and it is doubtful that
spending more time lobbying policymakers could improve that track
record.
Yet lobbying activity by these companies is unlikely to dissipate.
One reason for this growth is obvious since, as political scientist Lee
300. L. Gordon Crovitz, Silicon Valley's 'Suicide Impulse,' WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278 87323539804578266290231304934.html.
301. See Tam Harbert, Internet Giants Adopt New Lobbying Tactics, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Sept. 27, 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/internet/internet-giants-adopt-new-lobbyingtactics.
302. Cecilia Kang, FCC Chiefs PainstakingApproach Earns Mixed Reviews in Turbulent
Times for Telecom Industry, WASH. PosT (Nov 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/technology/2012/11/27/6fda5576-2f59-11e2-ac4a-33b8b41fb531 story.html.
303. Id.
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Drutman points out, lobbying can generate a demand of its own and
become reinforcing:
The modem growth of corporate lobbying reflects a pathdependent learning process. Companies may come to Washington
for many different reasons, but the act of establishing an office
sets in motion several reinforcing processes that make companies
value lobbying more and more over time and that lead companies
to become more proactive in their political strategies. The overall
effect is that American businesses, once skeptical of government,
cautious about getting involved in politics, and reactive in their
strategies, have now become increasingly confident, proactive,
and aggressive in their lobbying efforts, and businesses are
increasingly seeing government policy as not just a threat, but
also as a tool. 304
The rapid expansion in lobbying activity over the past 2 years has

been led by tech innovators such as Google, 30 5 Facebook, 306 Netflix, 307
Pandora, 30 and others.309 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the growth of
lobbying expenditures in this sector.310 Meanwhile, calls for more
political3 1 activism are growing among notable technology industry

figures.

1

304. Lee J. Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: Explaining the Growth of
Corporate Political Activity in Washington, DC, 1 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Berkley), available at http://www.leedrutman.com/uploads/2/3/0/1/
2301208/business ofamericaislobbying.pdf.
305. See Russ Choma, Learningfrom Microsoft's Mistakes, Google Invests Heavily in
Influence, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (Jan. 7, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/

0 1/leaming-from-microsofts-mistakes-g.html.
306. See David Saleh Rauf, Facebook Lobbying Sets Record in Q2, POLITICO (July 21,
2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78804.html; Cecilia Kang,
Facebook Triples Lobbying Budget from Last Year, Eyes White House, WASH. POST (July 23,
2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/facebook-ttiples-lobby
ing-budget-eyes-white-house/2012/07/23/gJQAodvo4W blog.html.
307. See Jess Kamen, Big Week Ahead for Cybersecurity, POLITICO (July 23, 2012, 9:30
AM), http://www.politico.com/morningtech/0712/morningtech5l6.html.
308. See Elahe Izadi, Pandora, Growing Up Washington Style, NAT'L J. (July 9, 2012),
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/blogs/influencealley/2012/07/pandora-growing-up-washingtonstyle-09.
309. See Somini Sengupta, Tech Giants Bracefor More Scrutiny from Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/technology/tech-giants-learning-theways-of-washington-brace-for-more-scrutiny.html? r-0 ("At the end of 2012, tech companies
were on track to have spent record amounts on lobbying for the year.").
310. The data for Figures 1 and 2 was supplied from the Center for Responsive Politics
and complied by the Authors. The Figures represent non-inflation-adjusted totals.
311. See Michelle Quinn, Tech Lobbyists' New Mantra: Strength Through Unity, POLITICO
(July 16, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78567.html; Tony
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In 2010, for example, Reid Hoffman, founder of LinkedIn, the
popular social networking site for business professionals, worried that
policymakers tend to ignore high-tech startups. 3 12 "We don't have an
entrepreneurship lobby," he said, "because entrepreneurs are off [being
entrepreneurial]."313 In particular, he fretted about startups not getting
their share of recent stimulus funding. 3 14 "It's much easier when you're
embedded in the political infrastructure to respond to immediate things"
like the stimulus package, he said.3 1 s
Lauren Weinstein, an Internet activist and the cofounder of People
for Internet Responsibility, has called for the formation of an Internet
policy Super PAC "to not only lobby in the name of protecting freedom
and other rights on the Internet, but to also directly promote the election
of politicians with sensible views regarding Internet freedoms,
technology, and the intersection of these areas with individuals and
society at large." 3 16 He argues that,
[I]f we don't learn to "play the game" the way the big boys do in
Washington and other seats of government around the world, we
and our ideas will be steamrolled. If we refuse to utilize all legal
tools at our disposal to affect the political process in the name of
our own goals, we and Internet freedoms will be crushed.3 17
In one sense, both Hoffman and Weinstein are correct; it certainly is
easier to "play the game" when you have a small army of lobbyists
inside the Beltway asking for special treatment or taxpayer handouts.
But it is not clear whether they-and others in the Internet
community-have fully considered the costs of such activities. Hightech America's expanded embrace of Washington could take it down
the familiar path followed by the agriculture and automotive sectors
(among many others), with government becoming both protector and
punisher of industry. The entrepreneurialism that Hoffman and others
care most about will then be at serious risk. Today's dynamic tech
industries will increasingly stagnate as they come under the "Mother,
may I?" permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older
information technology sectors.
312. See Sara Jerome, Silicon Valley Needs a D.C. Lobby, Hoffman Says, Hillicon Valley,
HILL (Aug. 27, 2010, 5:58 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/116121silicon-valley-needs-a-dc-lobby-hoffman-says.
313. Id
314. Id
315. Id
316. Lauren Weinstein, Internet Rights, Internet Wrongs, and Internet War, LAUREN
WEINSTEIN'S BLOG (July 4, 2012), http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000972.html.

317.
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B. The State and Local Tax-Break Bonanza
State and local lawmakers who hope to encourage investment by
high-tech companies are increasingly tapping tax credits and other taxcode-based inducements (such as tax rebates). Such efforts are
sometimes described as "industrial recruitment" and in the older
economy as "smokestack chasing." 318 While job creation is an oft-stated
goal of such actions, when it comes to high-tech tax credits, it often
seems that state and local policymakers are mostly offering such
inducements to enhance the status or prestige of their communities. That
is, they hope to create "the next Hollywood " "the next Silicon Valley,"
or "the next tech hub" in their region. 319 Political scientists and
economists refer to such behavior as "credit claiming" 320-politicians
looking to claim credit for their industrial recruitment efforts. Tax
inducements are not as egregious a form of cronyism as the various
types of government-granted privileges enjoyed by communications and
media operators in the past. Nonetheless, when tax inducements target
specific firms or sectors, they raise issues of both efficiency and
fairness. First, in terms of efficiency, tax credits are, quite obviously,
devised to incentivize certain investments. But incentives may have the
consequence of redirecting societal resources to businesses or
technologies that have very little market demand.
Second, the costs associated with awarding tax credits to one set of
interests are ultimately borne by other interests or individuals. If state
and local lawmakers are looking to boost investments by tech
companies by granting them favorable tax treatment, such favoritism
will likely come at the expense of established businesses and
individuals in those communities who will be forced to cover the tax
shortfall.
Third, tax credits for digital technology companies are particularly
misguided because (a) the most successful companies do not need them
and (b) the smaller companies or startups that might benefit from them
present a very risky investment for taxpayers. Startups, famously, may
be here today but gone tomorrow. Policymakers should leave such risky
investments to venture capitalists and other private investors so
taxpayers are not on the hook.
Finally, tax credits can actually become a time-consuming morass
318. Robert C. Turner, The PoliticalEconomy of GubernatorialSmokestack Chasing: Bad
Policy and Bad Politics?, 3 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 270,270 (2003).
319. Alisha Hipwell, Pittsburgh Reinvents Itself as the New Hollywood, CNNMoNEY
(Aug. 7, 2012, 6:05 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/07/smallbusiness/pittsburgh-film/
index.htm?iid=HP River.
320. Charlotte Twight, From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of
CongressionalStrategyfor Asbestos Management, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y 153 passim (1991).
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for innovators. Firms that ask for political privileges tend to be less
innovative and less profitable. 32 1 A recent Wall Street Journal report
noted that "many companies are saying 'no, thanks' and are likely
paying more taxes than legally required," because "the tax deductions
are either too cumbersome or too confusing. In some cases, the cost of
obtaining the tax benefit is greater than the benefit itself."32 2
These are just some of the issues to keep in mind while reviewing
the growth of government-granted tax privileges in the high-tech sector.
The following corporate case studies provide examples of how some
tech firms have already sought and received special treatment from
government officials.
1. Apple
In March 2012, Texas Governor Rick Perry announced that the
Texas Enterprise Fund would provide Apple Inc. with $21 million of
state funds over 10 years. 23 In return, Apple would create
approximately 3635 new jobs by 2025 through a $304 million
investment to open an operations center outside of Austin.32 4 In
addition, the city will provide Apple with $8.6 million in tax rebates and
Travis County will provide Apple with $5.4 million to $6.4 million over
the course of the project.325 Temporary contractors will account for 25%
of anticipated new workers. 326
During negotiations, Apple explained that it considered other
locations besides Austin. 32 7 Yet there is some doubt that Apple was
serious about any location besides Austin. In Phoenix, regarded as
Austin's main competitor to host the operations center, Arizona
321.

See Chun-Lei Yang, Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic

Development, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 640, 648 (1998).

322. John D. McKinnon, Firms Pass Up Tax Breaks, Citing Hassles, Complexity, WALL
ST. J. (July 23, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444025204
577543060812237798.html.
323. Press Release, Governor Rick Perry, Gov. Perry Announces Apple to Create 3,600
New Jobs in Austin (Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, Governor Perry], http://www.
governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/17021.
324. Farzad Mashhood, Apple Gets FinalApproval from County, Locks in at Least $5.4
Million in Tax Rebates, STATESMAN.COM (May 1, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.statesman.com/
blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/cityhall/entries/2012/05/01/apple getsfinal approval fr
om.html?cxntcid= breaking-news; see Press Release, Governor Perry, supra note 323.
325. Mashhood, supra note 324. One Travis County commissioner voted against the deal
because of the absence of any provision that would ensure "economically disadvantaged" local
residents would be hired. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Betty Beard, Was Apple Serious About Phoenix-Area Site?, AZCENTRAL.COM
(Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2012/03/21/20120321
apple-serious-about-phoenix-site.html.
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economic development officials were notified of the opportunity to host
the center only about a month before Apple formally announced its deal
with the Texas Enterprise Fund. 328 Furthermore, these officials were
only given 3 days in February 2012 to prepare a pitch for why Phoenix
was a suitable location for the center. If Apple was bluffing, Austin
gave it something for nothing.
Regardless, at least $35 million in public funds will be credited to
Apple from state and local governments as a result of the American
operations center project.33 0 Yet these 2012 tax credits and subsidies are
only a fraction of the taxpayer money that Apple received, directly and
indirectly, from local, state, and federal governments in 2011.
According to Apple's 10-K annual report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 2011, the firm received $167 million in
research and development tax credits and a $168 million domestic
production activities deduction from the federal government. 33 1
2. Twitter
In 2011, after 2 years at the same location in San Francisco, Twitter
had already rented another floor in its office building but still had too
many employees for its location.332 For its new headquarters, company
managers looked to move to a nearby city that did not require a payroll
tax.33 To prevent Twitter from leaving the city, San Francisco city
managers sought ways to make San Francisco more attractive for the
company. 334 To that end, city lawmakers approved in April 2011 the
"Twitter tax break"-an exemption from payroll taxes for 6 years with a

328. Id.
329. Id
330. See Shonda Novak, Apple Buys Tracts at Site of Proposed Operations Center,
STATESMAN.COM (July 18, 2012, 9:14 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/business/realsee also supra text
estate/apple-buys-tracts-at-site-of-proposed-operations-I /nRqFd;
accompanying notes 323 & 325.
331. Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 24, 2011), available at
The
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312511282113/d220209d1Ok.htm.
domestic production activities deduction is a provision of the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act
implemented in order to incentivize small businesses to generate manufacturing jobs in the
United States. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 102, 118 Stat.
1418, 1424.
332. See Leslie Horn, Is Twitter Leaving San Francisco?, PCMAG.COM (Jan. 14, 2011,
2:32 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817, 2375752,00.asp.
333. See Sara Yin, Twitter Could Save $22M in San Fran Tax Exemption, PCMAG.COM
(Apr. 6, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2383167,00.asp.
334. See Horn, supra note 332.
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$22 million estimated benefit. 335 Days later, the popular microblogging
service announced it would keep its primary headquarters in downtown
San Francisco "after a months-long campaign to secure a payroll tax
break from the Board of Supervisors in return for staying in the city and
agreeing to relocate to the troubled mid-Market Street area," according
to PCMag.com.336 According to the San Francisco Examiner, the
"Twitter tax break" prompted other tech companies to request tax
breaks from the city.
Meanwhile, according to BuzzFeed, "Twitter and six other San
Francisco tech companies are set to receive sizable tax breaks from the
city in exchange for [non-binding promises to make] charitable
contributions totaling, in many cases, just tens of thousands of dollarsalong with promoted tweets for local groups." 338 Other companies that
are receiving those tax breaks include Yammer, a Microsoft subsidiary;
Zoosk; One Kings Lane; ZenDesk; and 21Tech. 3 9
3. Amazon
As online retailer Amazon expanded its physical presence in several
U.S. states and began building more warehouses and fulfillment centers,
it opened itself up to new tax-collection liabilities. Amazon had
traditionally opposed online sales taxes, correctly arguing that state and
local governments did not have the constitutional authority to impose
sales tax-collection obligations on "remote," or out-of-state, sellers with
no physical presence within the given state or locality. 340 But once it
built physical facilities in those states or localities, Amazon would
normally be required by law to collect sales taxes on purchases made by
consumers in those areas, just as any other retailer would.3 4 '
To counter or defer these new tax-collection obligations, Amazon
335. Gerry Shih, San FranciscoSupervisors Pass 'Twitter Tax Break,' BAY CITIZEN (Apr.
19, 2011, 6:26 PM), http://www.bay citizen.org/business/story/supervisors-twitter-tax-break;
Yin, supra note 333.
336. Stephanie Mlot, Twitter Embraces New Nest, Remains in San Francisco,
PCMAG.COM (June 11, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2405638,00.
asp.
337. See Joshua Sabatini, Twitter Tax Break Approved by San FranciscoSupervisors, S.F.
EXAMINER (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.sf examiner.com/local/2011/04/twitter-tax-breakapproved-san-francisco-supervisors.
338. Justine Sharrock, Promises of Charity Won Tax Breaks for Tech Companies,
BuzzFEED (Jan. 27, 2013, 7:22 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/justinesharrock/how-techcompanies-bought-big-tax-breaks-with-prom-8887.
339. Id.
340.

See VERONIQUE DE RUGY & ADAM THIERER, MERCATUS CTR., THE INTERNET, SALES

TAXES, AND TAX COMPETITION 1-2 (2011), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/internet-

sales-taxes-and-tax-competition.
341. Id.
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sought to cut deals in some states to give the company special treatment
compared to other businesses in exchange for promises of jobs and
investment in those states or localities.342 Amazon made such deals with
South Carolina and Texas, among other states. 34 3 For example, the
company was able to avoid a $269 million tax bill in Texas despite the
presence of a distribution center in Irving.344 In 2012, Amazon struck a
deal with the state to release the company from its tax bill in exchange
for a promise to open new distribution facilities and hire 2500
workers. 34 5 Similarly, Amazon secured a 5-year exemption from salestax-collection obligations in South Carolina after promising to build a
distribution center there. 346
4. LivingSocial
In July 2012, the DC Council approved the Social E-Commerce Job
Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012. 47 The deal provided LivingSocial,
a popular online coupon service, with corporate and property tax
exemptions in Washington, DC, worth approximately $32.5 million
over 5 years beginning in 2015.348 Legislators feared that LivingSocial
would relocate to an area with a lower tax rate. 349
In exchange for the $32.5 million, LivingSocial said it would attempt
to add 1000 employees to its payroll, roughly doubling its number of
employees in the district. 3 50 However, no contractual guarantee for job
creation exists, and the firm had never been profitable. 3 5 1 There were
some contractual obligations required for LivingSocial to receive these
342. Id. at 2.
343. Id; see Kenneth Corbin, Amazon Reaches Agreement with Indianaon Sales Taxes,
ECOMMERCEBYTES (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/yl2/m01/il1/s04.
344. Ross Ramsey, Let's Make a Deal, Amazon Tells Texas, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/us/24ttramseyhtml.
345. Louise Story, Lines Blur as Texas Gives Industries a Bonanza, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/us/winners-and-losers-in-texas.html?_r-l1&.
346. David Slade, Amazon to SC Residents: Pay Tax on the Stuff You Bought Last Year,
POST & COURIER (Mar. 23, 2012, 6:32 PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120127/
PC05/301279979.

347. See Social E-Commerce Job Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012, 59 D.C. Reg. 8712
(July 27, 2012); see also Notice, Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Law 19-174, Social
Social E-Commerce Job Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012 (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.dcregs.dc.gov/Gateway/NoticeHome.aspx?NoticelD=438073 1.
348. Tim Craig, D.C. CouncilApproves LivingSocial Tax Breaks, WASH. POST (June 26,
2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-wire/post/dc-council-approveslivingsocial-tax-breaks/2012/06/26/gJQAQAvv4V blog.html.
349. Id.
350. See Steven Overly, D.C. Council Approves LivingSocial Tax Break, WASH. POST
(July 10, 2012, 2:10PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-business/post/dccouncil
approveslivingsocialtaxbreak/2012/07/1 0/gJQA7QL3aW-blog.html.
351.

Id.
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tax exemptions, such as a requirement that it must establish a program
to mentor DC high school students, provide internships for DC students,
remain in the district, 352 and create a 200,000-square-foot
headquarters. 353 LivingSocial must also ensure that 50% of newly hired
employees live in the district in order to receive the Act's full $32.5
million in exemptions.3 54
Just a few months after the deal was struck, it had already become
apparent just how risky of a bet the DC government had made. In late
November 2012, LivingSocial announced a net loss of $566 million for
the third quarter and that hundreds of employees would be laid off. 5
The company ended 2012 with just $76 million in cash and current
assets, but had $338 million in short-term liabilities.356 As a result, the
firm's common stock was deemed "worthless" by market watchers,3 5 7
despite a $110 million cash infusion by investors in February 2013.
The promise to roughly double the size of its DC-based workforce
seems unlikely to be kept. 359
5. Groupon
Like Twitter, Groupon, the fast-growing tech company, expanded
beyond its original headquarters in Chicago in 2010 and needed a new

352.

See Craig,supra note 348.

353.

Gov'T OF THE D.C. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, TAX ABATEMENT ANALYSIS OF

THE SOCIAL E-COMMERCE JOB CREATION TAX INCENTIVE ACT OF 2012, at 2 (Apr. 11, 2012),

available at http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo
final tafa_ecommerce act-of 2012.pdf.
354. Id. at 3.
355. Jonathan O'Connell, LivingSocial Plans to Lay Off Hundreds in US., Company
Sources Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
capital-business/post/Iivingsocial-plans-to-lay-off-hundreds-in-us-company-sources-say/20 12/
11 /28/56ee5602-399f- 1le2-bO1f-5f55bl93f58f blog.html.
356. Living Social Receives Emergency $1 10M Debt Infusion From Existing Investors
With Oppressive Terms, PRIvCo (Feb. 20, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.privco.com/livingsocialreceives-emergency-I1 Om-cash-infusion-from-existing-investors-to-avoid-bankruptcy.
357. Id
358. Thomas Heath, LivingSocial Receives $110 Million Cash Infusion, WASH. POST (Feb.
20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/livingsocial-receives- 110-mill
ion-cash-infusion/2013/02/20/618163ea-7b79-1 le2-9a75-dabO201670da story. html.
359. See, e.g., Bill Flook, For LivingSocial, the Snark Train Rolls In, WASH. BUS. J. (Oct.
31, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/washington/blog/2012/10/for-livingsocial-thesnark-train.html. In January 2014, the company announced it would be closing its storefront in
Northwest DC and its founder and chief executive announced he plans to leave the company,
increasing doubts the company will survive much longer. Benjamin Freed, LivingSocial to Close
Its DC Storefront After Another Bad Year, WASHINGTONIAN (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.
washingtonian.com/blogs/capitalcomment/local-news/l ivingsocial-to-close-its-dc-storefront-aft
er-another-bad-year.php.
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lease. 360 In October 2010, the company received a $3.5 million
incentive package from Illinois in return for a promise to create 250
jobs in Chicago.3 6 1 That same year, Illinois had the highest deficit of
any U.S. state and owed $37.9 billion to creditors.362 Groupon has been
struggling in recent quarters and is363looking like an increasingly risky bet
in terms of its long-term viability.
6. Motorola
The deal between Motorola and the state of Illinois illustrates the
dangers of permitting ad hoc, secretive agreements with favored firms.
In May 2011, Motorola Mobility secured more than $100 million in tax
credits and incentives from Illinois in exchange for a promise to keep its
headquarters in Libertyville.364 At the deal-signing ceremony, Governor
Pat Quinn surmised that President Abraham Lincoln "would be so
proud that our state, Illinois, is home to Motorola." 365
Although Motorola and Governor Quinn made an "oral agreement"
that Motorola Mobility would maintain a workforce of 3000 in
Libertyville, the actual agreement reads differently. 366 The true terms
were not revealed until the Chicago Tribune filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request.367 Unlike any other deals formulated
by the state-sponsored Economic Development for a Growing Economy
(EDGE) program, this deal explicitly provided that Motorola need not

360.

See Eddie Baeb, Groupon Signs Big Expansion at HQ, CHI. REAL ESTATE DAILY

(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.chicagorealestatedaily.com/article/20101208/CRED03/101209888/
groupon-signs-big-expansion-at-hq.
361. Id.; Melissa Harris, Groupon Defends State Aid, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-10-28/business/ct-biz-1028-confidential-groupon-20101
028_1_groupon-state-aid-life-fitness.
362. Andrew Thomason, Illinois 50 out of 50 in 2010 for State Deficit, ILL. WATCHDOG
(July 28, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://watchdog.org/39913/ilshn-illinois-50-out-of-50-in-2010-forstate-deficit-2/.
363. See Evelyn M. Rush & John Letzing, Groupon's Growth Slows; Shares Plummet
After-Hours, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000
1424127887323894704578107304122978748.
364. See Kathy Bergen & Wailin Wong, $100 Million Keeps Motorola Mobility in Illinois,
CHI. TRIB. (May 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-05-06/business/ct-biz-0507motorola-incentives-20110506_1_tax-credit-package-pat-quinn-quinn-sign.
365. Korrina Grom, Motorola Headquarters to Remain in Libertyville, LIBERTYVILLE
PATCH (May 6, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://libertyville.patch.com/articles/motorola-headquarters-toremain-in-libertyville.
366. See Alejandra Cancino, Wiggle Room in Motorola Mobility's State Tax Break, CH.
TRIB. (June 19, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-19/business/chi-motorolamobility-could-lay-off-790-and-keep-state-tax-break-20110619_1 motorola-mobility-incentivestate-tax.
367. Id.
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hire any additional workers. 368 According to the May 2011 agreement
obtained through FOIA, Motorola Mobility will receive $113.7 million
in tax credits and incentives for simply retaining 2500 employees and
promising to invest $600 million in the state.369
Only months after the agreement was announced, on August 15
2011, Google announced an agreement to acquire Motorola Mobility.376
In October 2011, as this deal was pending regulatory approval,
Motorola Mobility announced it would cut 185 jobs in Illinois, which
did not threaten tax breaks from the state because of the carefully
worded agreement. 37 1 In December, due to concerns about the Google
deal, State Representative Jack Franks sponsored a bill mandating that
EDGE program deals be disclosed on the Illinois Department of
Commerce and Economic Opportunity website.372 Shortly thereafter, on
January 26, 2012, Motorola Mobility announced that it had lost $80
million in the 4th fiscal quarter of 2011.373 Then, on May 1, the
company announced it had lost $86 million in the 1st fiscal quarter of
2012, almost 1 year to the day after Governor Quinn announced the
$113.7 million deal.3 74
Four days later, Crain's Chicago Business reported that Google was
planning to relocate Motorola Mobility away from Libertyville. Two
months afterward, Governor Quinn signed Representative Jack Franks'
transparency bill into law.3 7 His spokesman remarked, "Governor

368. Id.
369. Alejandra Cancino, New Law to Shed More Light on State Tax Credit Program,CHI.
TRIB. (July 6, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-06/business/chi-new-law-toshed-more-light-on-state-tax-credit-program-20120706_1_motorola-mobility-credits-tax-incent
ive-package.
370. Press Release, Google Investor Relations, Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html.
371. Wailin Wong, Motorola Mobility to Cut 800 Jobs, 185 in Ill., CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 31,
2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-31/business/chi-motorola-mobility-to-cut800-job-sec-filing-shows-20111028_1_motorola-mobility-severance-costs-jobs.
372. See H.R. 3934, 97th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 2011) (as filed in House, Dec. 11, 2011); see
also Alejandra Cancino, State Rep Wants Panel to Review Tax-Break Requests, CHI. TRIB. (Dec.
22, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-22/business/chi-representative-seeksoversight-of-state-tax-break-requests-2 0111222_1 tax-credits-tax-break-franks.
373. Donald Melanson, Motorola Announces Q4 2011 Earnings: $3.4 Billion Revenue,
$80 Million Net Loss, ENGADGET (Jan. 26, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/01/
26/motorola-announces-q4-2011-earnings-3-4-billion-revenue-80-m.
374. Terrence O'Brien, Motorola Mobility Loses $86 Million in Q1, Device Shipments
Way Down, ENGADGET (May 1, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/05/01/
motorola-mobility-loses-86-million-in-ql -device-shipments-way/.
375. See John Pletz, Google Makes Plans to Move Motorola Mobility to Chicago, CRAIN's
CHI. Bus. (May 4, 2012), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120504/NEWS08/
120509853/google-makes-plans-to-move-motorola-mobility-to-chicago.
376. See H.R. 3934, 97th Leg., Ist Sess. (Ill. 2011) (enacted July 6, 2012).
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Quinn has long advocated for openness in government." 377 In August
2012, Google announced major job cuts for Motorola as part of its
restructuring.378 Illinois taxpayers, who had their taxes increased during
a recession to improve the state's fiscal condition, will be left on the
hook for these corporate giveaways.
7. Film Production
Motion picture studios benefit from a federal tax break that allows
production companies to deduct the first $15 million in filming costs
from taxes; 379 however, it is state and local tax incentives for movie
production that have expanded most rapidly over the past decade. 380
These inducements include tax credits, sales tax exemptions, cash
rebates, direct grants, and tax or fee reductions for lodging or locational
shooting.3 9 In 2002, only 5 states offered such inducements for movie
production.382 By the end of 2009, 45 states had incentives in place to
lure film producers.38 In 2010, the film industry received an estimated
$1.5 billion in financial commitments from these programs. 384
Unsurprisingly, these incentives have proven very popular with movie
studios. Of the 9 motion pictures that were nominated for Best Picture at
the Academy Awards in 2012, 5 had received taxpayer-funded rebates,
The Help received
tax credits, and subsidies from state governments.
377. Cancino, supra note 370.
378. See Claire Cain Miller, Motorola Set for Big Cuts as Google Reinvents It, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/technology/motorola-to-cut-20-of-workforce-part-of-sweeping-change.html? r-i&pagewanted=all.
379. Yadl Ossowski, How Walt Disney Cashes in on Corporate Welfare, REASON (Jan. 6,
2013, 1:00 PM), http://reason.com/archives/2013/01/06/how-walt-disney-cashes-in-on-corpo
rate-w.
380. See State Film Incentives, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaitra.org/state-film-incent
ives (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); see also Christopher Rowland, Tax Lobbyists Help Businesses
Reap Windfalls, B. GLOBE (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/
03/16/corporations-record-huge-retums-from-tax-lobbying-gridlock-congress-stalls-reform/om
gZvDPa37DNISqiOG95YK/story.html.
381.

WILLIAM LUTHER, TAX FOUNDATION, SPECIAL REPORT No. 173, MOVIE PRODUCTION

INCENTIVES: BLOCKBUSTER SUPPORT FOR LACKLUSTER POLICY 6-7 (2010), available at http://tax

foundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/srl 73.pdf.
382. Id. at 1.
383. Id.; see State Film Production Incentives & Programs, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/state-film-production-

incentives-and-programs.aspx.
384.
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385. Will Wilson, Oscar Night Secret: Tax Breaks for Films Go Undisclosed in Many
States, STATELINE (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/oscarnight-secret-tax-breaks-for-films-go-undisclosed-in-many-states-85899375403.
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a $3,547,780 Mississippi spending rebate, and The Tree ofLife received
incentives from Texas totaling $434,253.386 As of February 2012, Best
Picture-nominee Moneyball was eligible to receive up to $5.8 million in
California tax credits.387 The movie grossed over $75 million at the box
office.38 8 More recently, the biopic Lincoln received roughly $3.5
million in tax incentives from the Virginia Film Office. 389
Many state and local governments offer these inducements in the
hope of attracting new jobs and investment; others simply seek to bill
themselves as "the new Hollywood."3 9 0 It seems that the glamour and
prestige associated with films and celebrities have trumped sound
economics, however, since there is little evidence these tax incentives
help state or local economies.
"Based on fanciful estimates of economic activity and tax revenue,
states are investing in movie production projects with small returns and
taking unnecessary risks with taxpayer dollars," noted a 2010 Tax
Foundation study.39 "In return, they attract mostly temporary jobs that
are often transplanted from other states."3 92 Studies of specific stateincentive programs confirm this statement, almost universally finding
miniscule revenue gains for every dollar of film subsidies offered.3
The only 2 studies that have revealed positive results for such filmincentive programs were both conducted by Ernst & Young on behalf of
the New York and New Mexico film offices. 394 Other reports have
shown consistent negative returns.3 95
Recently, some states have begun abandoning or limiting filmincentive programs or at least taking a hard look at their
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Moneyball, YAHOO! MOVIES, http://movies.yahoo.com/movie/moneyball (last visited
Oct. 10, 2013).
389. Carten Cordell & Kathryn Watson, How Steven Spielberg's Lincoln Benefited from
Crony Capitalism,REASON (Nov. 15, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/11/15/how-stevenspielbergs-lincoln-benefited.
390. LUTHER, supra note 381, at 7. ("Some jobs are more glamorous than others.
Hollywood epitomizes glamour. From politicians' point of view, bringing Hollywood to town is
the best of all possible photo opportunities-not just a ribbon-cutting to announce new job
creation but a ribbon-cutting with a movie or TV star.").
391. Id. at 1.
392. Id.
393. See TANNENWALD, supra note 384, at 8, app. at 16 tbl.3.
394.

See ERNST & YOUNG, ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE FILM CREDIT

passim (2009), available at http://www.southwindsor.org/pages/swindsorctIT/ctstudios/
Credit Study.pdf (discussing the economic impacts of film credits in New York); ERNST &
YOUNG, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE NEW MEXICO FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT

passim (2009), available at http://www.nmfilm.com/uploads/files/nmfilmCreditlmpactAnaly
sis.pdf (discussing the economic impacts of film credits in New Mexico).
395. See, e.g., TANNENWALD, supra note 384, at 8, app. at 16 tbl.3.
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effectiveness.396 Iowa, for example, suspended its film program in 2009
after an investigation revealed a scandal involving much waste and
abuse. 39 7 This scandal resulted in "[10] criminal cases[,] [through]
which seven people were eventually convicted." 398 Michigan Governor
Rick Snyder also started reining in his state's film program as evidence
mounted that the program has failed to create local jobs and has cost the
state a great deal of tax revenue. 399
8. Video-Game Makers
Following the example set by motion picture studios, many video
game companies have been pursuing state-based tax incentives in recent
years. As with the motion picture industry, these tax incentives take the
form of credits, rebates, grants, and exemptions. States offer such
inducements "in hopes of attracting successful businesses and possibly
becoming the 'Hollywood' of the video game industry." 400
As of mid-2011, 20 states offered some form of tax inducement.4 0 '
According to the Entertainment Software Association, the video game
industry's trade association, in 2011,
Twenty-five tax incentive proposals were introduced in 13 states
and Puerto Rico. At the same time, in response to increased
budget pressures, nine bills in three states were introduced to
either reduce or eliminate incentives for game production. Four
positive incentive bills for the industry passed in Florida, Puerto
Rico, Texas and Utah in 2011. All of the bills proposing
reduction or elimination of video game incentives were

396.

See JOSEPH HENCHMAN, TAX FOUNDATION, FISCAL FACT NO. 272, MORE STATES

ABANDON FILM TAX INCENTIVES AS PROGRAMS' INEFFECTIVENESS BECOMES MORE APPARENT

(2011), available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/more-states-abandon-film-tax-incentivesprograms-ineffectiveness-becomes-more-apparent.
397. See e.g., Joe Kristan, Iowa Film Tax Credit Scandal: A Warningfor Other States, in
LUTHER, supra note 381, at 9 (discussing abuse of tax credits in Iowa).
398. David Pitt, Film Financier Sues Iowa Over Unpaid Film Credits, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-12-04/film-financiersues-iowa-over-unpaid-film-credits.
399. See Louise Story, Michigan Town Woos Hollywood, But Ends Up With a Bit Part,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/us/when-hollywood-comes-totown.html? r=0.
400.

SEAN

KANE,

A

STATE-BY-STATE

GUIDE

TO

BUSINESS

INCENTIVES

FOR YOUR

INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT PRODUCTION 1 (2010), available at http://www.slcatlanta.org/

news/film tax credits/SET WhitePaper USProductionincentives 12710 final(1).pdf.
401.

STEPHEN D. RIDEN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR VIDEO GAME COMPANIES (2010, rev. 2011),

availableat http://www.beckreedriden.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Video-Game-Tax-Ince
ntives-June-201 I.pdf.
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defeated.402
In the previous year, state legislators in 16 states introduced a total
of 37 tax incentive bills, of which 2 passed, while state legislators in 6
states proposed 13 measures to eliminate tax incentives, but, again, none
passed.
The industry also benefits from a variety of federal tax
4
04
breaks.
Video game tax incentives were at the center of a recent controversy
in Rhode Island involving former major-league baseball player Curt
Schilling.4 0 5 The state sued a video game studio founded by Schilling,
38 Studios LLC, in an effort "to recover some of the $75 million in
loans it guaranteed to lure the firm from Massachusetts and alleg[ed]
that the former Boston Red Sox pitcher and associates manipulated the
state to secure the financing." 406 Evidence came to light after the state
made the 38 Studios deal that it was riskier than its sponsors originally
suggested.4 0 7 Thus, the 38 Studios deal is an example of "why public
entities should never be involved in picking winners and losers. One
reason is that such entities typically do not have the necessary
background to make informed judgments on the viability of companies
in the private sector." 408
V. STRATEGIES TO LIMIT CRONYISM

Dr. David R. Henderson, an economist, argues that, "[t]here is only
402.

ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION,

ANNUAL

REPORT 2011, at 3 (2012),

availableat http://www.theesa.com/about/ESA_201 lAnnualReport .pdf.
403.

ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION,

ANNUAL

REPORT 2010, at 3 (2011),

available at http://www.theesa.com/about/ESA_2010_Annual Report.pdf.
404. See David Kocieniewski, Rich Tax Breaks Bolster Makers of Video Games, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/technology/rich-tax-breaks-bols
ter-video-game-makers.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 ("Those tax incentives-a collection of
deductions, write-offs and credits mostly devised for other industries in other eras-now make
video game production one of the most highly subsidized businesses in the United States . . . .").
405. See Todd Wallack, 38 Studios' Troubles Could Cool Gaming Tax Breaks, B. GLOBE
(June 3, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/06/02/enthusiasm-for-gamingtax
breaksmaychillafterfallstudios/OFE3kpSl5JrF36pDVC7BeJ/story.html.
406. Michael B. Farrell, Rhode IslandSues Curt Schilling, 38 Studios to Recoup Losses, B.
GLOBE (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/l 1/01/rhode-island-suesstudios-recoup-losses/qwcZFNtpfslpAXupP2WCAM/story.html.
407. See Ted Nesi & Tim White, Target 12: EDC Ignored 38 Studios Signs, WPRI.COM
(Nov. 20, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/localnews/nesi/target-12-edcignored-38-studios-signs.
408. Jason Hidalgo, Fallen Kingdom: 38 Studios' Collapse and the Pitfalls of Using
Public Money to Support Tech Companies, ENGADGET (Sept. 7, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.engadget.com/2012/09/07/38-studios-collapse-and-risk-of-public-private-partners
hips.
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one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that
is to reduce government power. To reduce cronyism, we must abolish
regulations and cut or abolish special government subsidies.A409
McChesney agrees, noting that "[t]he one unambiguous solution for
reducing rent extraction is reducing the size of the state itself and its
power to threaten, expropriate, and transfer." 4 10
Henderson and McChesney are correct, but there are many strategies
to limit the "power to threaten, expropriate, and transfer" in the short
term. This Part V summarizes various strategies to limit cronyism and
regulatory capture in the information technology sectors.
A. DeregulationandRegulatory Streamlining
In Vietor's history of the economic deregulation of several U.S.
sectors, including telecommunications, airlines, natural gas, and
banking, he argues that "[d]eregulation unleashed competition with new
technology, new organizations, new suppliers and distribution." 4 11
Vietor summarizes the major benefits of deregulation as follows:
1. It expanded industry boundaries. 4 12
2. It lowered or eliminated barriers to entry and exit.4 13
3. It reconfigured established market segmentation, and pricing
mechanisms became more sophisticated.4 14
4. It allowed distribution channels to develop as sophisticated
415
competitive weapons.
5. It caused industry structure to change and led to more
competitors in every segment.4 16
6. Prices went down.4 17
To the extent that there was any downside to America's experience
with economic deregulation, Vietor says it was that service quality for
some consumers deteriorated slightly.4 18 But it is vital to recall that
409.

DAVID R. HENDERSON, MERCATUS CTR., THE ECONOMICS AND HISTORY OF CRONYISM

19(2012).
410.
411.

MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 170.
VIETOR, supra note 52, at 319.

412. Id. ("Industries defined by regulation gave way to broader structures defined by
technology, customer demand, and supplier economies.").
413. Id.
414. Id. This allowed creative pricing schemes to be developed to better serve different
consumers.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 50-52.
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under regulation, many providers could only compete on quality since
rates, quantity, and other variables were all controlled tightly by law. 4 19
That meant some providers-most notably airline carriers-went
overboard with service amenities, such as fancy meals or entertainment
on flights, to differentiate themselves from others. 420 Following
deregulation, it became clear that consumers were more interested in
competition on price, route options, and other variables-and that is
exactly what they got.4 21
Regardless, the important takeaway is that deregulation also limited
or even ended cronyism and capture opportunities. After liberalization,
there were simply fewer levers of control for industry to influence.
Deregulation forced companies to spend more time satisfying
consumers as opposed to lawmakers and regulators.
B. Auctions and PropertyRights
Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase argued that "political
pressures" on regulatory agencies would lead directly to
"malallocation[s] of resources."422 He noted that, while many
lawmakers bemoaned "the extent to which pressure is brought to bear
on the Commission by politicians and businessmen[,] ...

[t]hat this

should be happening is hardly surprising."4 23
When rights, worth millions of dollars, are awarded to one
businessman and denied to others, it is no wonder if some
applicants become overanxious and attempt to use whatever
influence they have (political and otherwise), particularly as they
can never be sure what pressure the other applicants may be
exerting. 424
Thus, Coase recognized the connection between the politicization of
spectrum policy and the special-interest politics and lobbying that
would inevitably accompany it. This problem, he explained, "largely
arises because of a failure to charge for the rights granted. If these rights
were disposed of to the highest bidder, the main reason for these
improper activities would disappear."4 2 5 In other words, by replacing
regulation with market mechanisms, government could reduce the
419. See supra Part II.
420. See supra Part lI.
421. See supra Part IL.
422. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16,
18 (1959).
423. Id.at 35-36.
424. Id at 36.
425. Id.
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favoritism and corruption that naturally accompany the political
allocation of wealth.
This is exactly what happened once lawmakers finally took Coase's
advice about radio-spectrum auctions. Congress granted the FCC the
power to auction cellular licenses in 1993, ensuring that those resources
could be largely privately managed and that markets, not regulatory
mandates, would govern decision-making.4 2 6 To be clear, auctions are
only permitted over a small sliver of the available radio spectrum, and
there are still some unnecessary restraints on who can bid and who can
trade. 42 7 With that caveat, where utilized, these auctions have raised
billions of dollars for the federal government and rationalized the
allocation of this valuable commercial input. 428 Auctions helped get
politics out of the spectrum-licensing field to some extent. "By
eliminating excess demand, auctions end rent seeking," argues Hazlett,
and "[c]ompetitive bidding is also a political cleanser, as arms length
transactions reduce opportunities for corruption." 429 The benefits of
auctions for the marketplace and consumers have been clear, Hazlett
notes, resulting in the following:
1. "Faster licensing. Auctions are relatively expedient, allowing
services to be provided more quickly." 430
2. "Efficient distribution. License auctions result in superior initial
assignments. Parties bidding the most [] tend to value licenses most." 43 1
3. "Efficient aggregation. Simultaneous auctions allowed markets
to determine [advanced cellular] service area size. License apgregation
instantly created regional and national coverage footprints.
4. "Efficient taxation. Lump sum payments to the Treasury
resulting from auctions constitute a welfare improvement over income
taxes because such transfers do not distort economic behavior." 433
5. "[M]omentum for liberalization. Perhaps the most important
aspect of auctions is that they have given market mechanisms a test
drive at the FCC. Despite warnings of public interest apocalypse, they
426. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312;
Hazlett, supra note 250, at 407.
427. See Edward Wyatt, A Dispute Over Restrictions in a US. Auction of Airwaves, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/business/media/fcc-spectrumauction-brings-fight-over-rules.html.
428. See GREGORY F. ROSE & MARK LLYOD, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE FAILURE OF
FCC SPECTRUM AUCTIONS 2 (2006), available at .http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/
spectrumauctions _may06.pdf.
429. Hazlett, supra note 250, at 407.
430. Id. at 408.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 409.
433. Id.

20131

A HISTORY OF CRONYISM AND CAPTURE IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYSECTOR

189

have worked." 4 34
If this same logic were applied to all spectrums, rent-seeking
pressures would diminish. Auctions and property rights would be
particularly helpful if applied to the broadcast spectrum, which, as noted
in Part III.C, is still governed by the same "public interest" regulatory
regime that has existed since the industry's earliest days.4 35
Cable franchising is an area that has improved but still presents
many challenges to regulation. As described in Part II.B.2, in 1992
Congress removed the ability of municipalities to grant exclusive
franchises,4 36 which led to much corruption in the 1970s and 1980s.
Further, many states have wisely adopted statewide franchising, which
overrides municipal grants of franchises, 437 and the rapid penetration of
U-Verse and FiOS in recent years is evidence of increasing video
competition. 438 However, robust competition is still absent in many
communities, partly as a result of the franchises granted decades ago
and partly as a result of the economics of building more videodistribution systems. 439 Most states still allow cities the much-abused
power to grant cable licenses. 44 0 While liberalization has occurred,
progress has been inconsistent.
There is no simple solution, but steps can be taken to improve
competition and limit political meddling. States that have not revoked
licensing abilities from localities should remove that particular
temptation. Easing right-of-way restrictions on entrants would also aid
competitive entry, but incumbent operators often ferociously, and
successfully, fight these efforts. Early franchisees wired whole
communities with the promise that competitors would not be allowed to
enter the market and cherry-pick the high-margin neighborhoods with
lower build-out costs. 44 1 While exclusive licenses are not permitted any
434. Id.
435. See OWEN, supra note 237, at 4. Owen argues that there is "no longer any reason for
FCC bureaucrats to decide how much of the spectrum should be used for each of many existing
and future commercial services." Id. Further, he recommends that policymakers "create efficient
markets in spectrum rights [] to permit licensees to use their assignments for purposes other than
the use originally designated, subject to noninterference with adjacent users." Id. at 11. In other
words, policymakers should institute strong property rights. "Providing adjacent spectrum users
with a legal remedy for interference (trespass) would provide incentives to reallocate spectrum
through market transactions." Id.
436. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
437.

See DIGITAL POLICY INST., supra note 174.

438.
439.
440.
441.

See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part
See supra Part

II.B.2.
II.B.2.
II.B.2.
II.B.2.
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longer, incumbents exhibited detrimental reliance on the economics of
exclusive licenses, and new entrants can upset their business models.
This reliance is not a reason to slow down competitive reforms, but
policymakers should recognize the source of resistance. The response
should be that the economics of video competition have changed
substantially in the past several decades. It is more important that
consumers benefit from more competition and lower prices rather than
preserve existing business models.
C. Vouchers
Cronyism sometimes develops around programs and policies that
have the best of intentions. As noted in Part II.B.3, this has been the
case with various "universal service" efforts over the past century. Yet,
when a communications welfare system is administered as a corporate
welfare program, it creates perverse incentives. It creates waste and
abuse because the higher the costs reported by the carrier providing the
service, the more funding the carrier receives from universal service
programs. 442 Moreover, delivering assistance through favored local
providers limits the potential for new entry and undermines
competition. 4 43 A means-tested voucher could target assistance to those
who need it without creating an inefficient, unsustainable hidden tax or
undermining competition.
In essence, targeted assistance is how food assistance is provided
today. Policymakers have wisely avoided providing assistance to needy
Americans by subsidizing grocery stores to deliver that assistance. 444 if
they had, it is likely that they would have created perverse incentives for
private operators to game the system and limited competition among
those providers. Unfortunately, those sorts of distortions are at work in
communications markets today, meaning rural communities served by
corporations that benefit from universal service programs could be
discouraging competitive entry. Thus, vouchers could help limit
cronyism in the provision of universal service.
D. Sunsets
Information technology companies must contend with the reality of
Moore's Law, first articulated by and named after Intel co-founder
Gordon E. Moore, which provides that "the processing power of
computers doubles roughly every 18 months while prices remain fairly
442. See supra Part II.B.3.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 436-40.
444. See, e.g., Ethan Epstein, Manhattan Moment: Defining 'FoodDeserts' Down, WASH.
EXAMINER (Apr. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/474066.
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constant."4 45 "Moore's Law has been a relentless regulator of markets
and has helped keep the power of 'tech titans' in check" by keeping
companies on their toes, constantly innovating to survive.446 Once
policymakers recognize the power of Moore's Law to naturally regulate
markets-and the corresponding danger of leaving Washington's laws
on the books too long-it should be clear why it is essential to align
America's legal and regulatory policies with the realities of modem tech
markets. Phasing out archaic and unnecessary laws and regulations is
also a useful way of minimizing the potential for cronyism.
Policymakers could achieve this
[B]y applying Moore's Law to all current and future laws and
regulations through two simple principles:
Principle 1. [Include in] [e]very new technology proposal a
provision sunsetting the law or regulation 18 months after
enactment. Policymakers can always reenact the rule if they
believe it is still sensible.
Principle 2. Reopen all existing technology laws and regulations
and reassess their worth. If no compelling reason for their
continued existence can be identified and substantiated, those
laws or rules should be repealed within 18 months. If a rationale
for continuing existing laws and regulations can be identified, the
rule can be re-implemented and Principle #1 applied to it.4 47
The test to determine whether to retain or repeal technology laws
and regulations should not be based on "[c]onjectural harms and
boogeyman scenarios..

.

. Policymakers must conduct a robust benefit-

cost analysis of all tech rules and then offer a clear showing of tangible
harm or actual market failure before enactment or reenactment of any
44 8
policy.

445. Adam Thierer, Sunsetting Technology Regulation: Applying Moore's Law to
Washington, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adam
thierer/2012/03/25/sunsetting-technology-regulation-applying-moores-law-to-washington;
see
also Moore's Law Inspires Intel Innovation, INTEL, http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/
silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
446. Thierer, supra note 445; see also Adam Thierer, Of "Tech Titans" and Schumpeter's
Vision, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2011/08/
22/of-tech-titans-and-schumpeters-vision.
447. Thierer, supra note 445.
448.

Id.; see also RICHARD WILLIAMS & JERRY ELLIG, MERCATUS CTR., REGULATORY

OVERSIGHT: THE BASICS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS passim (2011), available at

http://mercatus.org/publication/regulatory-oversight.
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E. Limits on CongressionalDelegation ofPower
Federal and state legislators often delegate broad, ambiguous
authority to regulatory agencies to help address various policy
objectives. Legislative delegation is particularly popular when the
industries or technologies being regulated are viewed as being more
complex in nature.
Unfortunately, as the histories documented in Part III made clear,
when agencies are given broad leeway to devise and administer
regulatory regimes, this opens the door to potential capture and rentseeking opportunities.449 As law professor David Schoenbrod notes in
Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
Through Delegation,
Agency heads are usually not apolitical and, indeed, concentrated
interests often prevail more easily in an agency than they can in
Congress. Effective participation in agency lawmaking usually
requires expensive legal representation as well as close
connections to members of Congress who will pressure the
agency on one's behalf. The agency itself is often closely linked
with the industry it regulates. Not only large corporations, but
also labor unions, cause-based groups, and other cohesive
minority interests sometimes can use delegation to triumph over
the interests of the larger part of the general public, which lacks
the organization, finances, and know-how to participate as
effectively in the administrative process.450
To limit the potential for abuse, Congress should take steps to rein in
agency power and limit delegation of open-ended powers to agencies in
the future. At a minimum, legislators must make their regulatory intent
and standards more clear before delegating authority to regulatory
agencies; and if they fail to do so, courts should not be shy about
declaring overly broad delegations of ambiguous authority to be
presumptively invalid under the Constitution.4 5 1

449. See supra Part III; see also Lars Noah, AdministrativeArm-Twisting in the Shadow of
CongressionalDelegationsofAuthority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873, 876-77 (1997).
450. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 13 (1993).

451. See Lowi, supra note 65, at 300 ("The [Supreme] Court's rule must once again
become one of declaring invalid and unconstitutional any delegation of power to an
administrative agency or to the president that is not accompanied by clear standards of
implementation.").
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F. Voluntary CorporateDisengagement
In 2000, T.J. Rodgers, the president and CEO of Cypress
Semiconductor, penned a prescient manifesto for the Cato Institute with
a provocative title: Why Silicon Valley Should Not Normalize Relations
with Washington, D.C.4 52 It was a blistering critique of Washington
rent-seeking culture and a clarion call warning high-tech companies not
to succumb to it.4 53 "The political scene in Washington is antithetical to
the core values that drive our success in the international marketplace
and risks converting entrepreneurs into statist businessmen," he
warned. 4 54 "The collectivist notion that drives policymaking in
Washington is the irrevocable enemy of high-technology capitalism and
the wealth creation process." 455
Sadly, it appears Rodgers' worst fears have been realized as
information technology markets and politics have become increasingly
intertwined. Perhaps this state of affairs should not be surprising. In
1997, McChesney predicted "Silicon Valley, with its sharp competition
but rapidly increasing stock of capital, would seem like a natural target
for (rent) extraction soon." 456
A handful of firms have shown that strategic disengagement is
possible. Apple and Sony, for example have so far bucked the trend to
engage as aggressively in politics. 45' While those firms have not
shunned political engagement entirely, compared to most other
information technology operators, which are rushing to expand their
presence in Washington and in state capitals to curry political favor,
Apple and Sony have largely focused on satisfying their customers
instead of policymakers.4 5 8
452.

T.J. RODGERS, WHY SILICON VALLEY SHOULD NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH

WASHINGTON, DC (2000), availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/silvalley.pdf.
453. See id.
454. Id. at 1.
455. Id.
456.
457.

MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 160.
Compare Google Inc, Annual Lobbying by Google Inc, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 28,

2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id-d000022008 (averaging just over
eleven million dollars spent on lobbying in 2013), with Sony Corp, Annual Lobbying by Sony
Corp, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=
D000022261&year-2013 (averaging just over one million dollars spent on lobbying in 2013),
and Apple Inc, Annual Lobbying by Apple Inc, OPENSECRETS.ORG

(Oct. 28,

2013),

https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000021754 (averaging just under two
million dollars spent on lobbying in 2012 and not reporting any money spent on lobbying in
2013); see David Saleh Rauf & Jonathan Allen, Apple's D.C. Lobbying Effort Has Yet to Ripen,
POLITICO (May 9, 2012, 12:14 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76073.html
(describing Apple's absence from Washington, D.C. and, speficially, the absence of any
significant lobbying efforts).
458. See supra note 457.
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It would be na'ive, however, to expect many firms to voluntarily
reject cronyism opportunities when they are available to them. That is
why the other institutional reforms itemized in this Article must first be
pursued to minimize the possibility that those opportunities will be
available at all.
Such reforms and efforts by industries to voluntarily distance
themselves from politics is important because, at least thus far in the
technology sector's brief history, information technology innovators
have not been burdened by the same regulatory obstacles faced by
analog-era producers. 459 If they hope to keep it that way, the first step is
to avoid the cronyist favor-seeking that earlier industries employed and
that opened the door to the sort of incessant marketplace meddling that
continues to haunt communications and media providers today.4 60
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the major ingredients and byproducts of
government favoritism in the fields of communications, media, and
information technology. Cronyism and regulatory capture have been
fixtures in these fields for many decades and now threaten to spread to
newer high-tech sectors.
Efforts to reform cronyist policies are challen ing because
"regulation is much easier to get than to get rid of." 61 Reform is
challenging due to what Gordon Tullock has called the "transitional
gains trap:" once a policy or program is put in place to favor a certain
interest, most of its gains come early and are factored into future
earnings. 462 Those benefiting from the policies would face large
transitional losses if reform were undertaken, even if these policies
impose large deadweight costs on society as a whole. 463 This "trap" can
frustrate beneficial reform efforts.4 64
The danger also exists, as the side effects of cronyism begin to
manifest themselves and efforts are made to remedy the problem
through additional regulatory efforts, that one intervention will simply

459. See Crovitz, supra note 300.
460. Id. ("Rather than lobby government to go after one another, Silicon Valley lobbyists
should unite to go after overreaching government. Instead of the "suicide impulse" of lobbying
for more regulation, Silicon Valley should seek deregulation and a long-overdue freedom to
return to its entrepreneurial roots.").
461. Fred S. McChesney, Of Stranded Costs and Stranded Hopes: The Difficulties of
Deregulation,3 INDEP. REv. 485, 506 (1999).
462. Gordon Tullock, The TransitionalGains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671, 671 (1975).
463. Id. at 671-72.
464. Id.
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beget another and another. 46 5 Economist Anne Krueger summarizes
how a "vicious circle" of rent-seeking results from those interventions:
If the market mechanism is suspect, the inevitable temptation is
to resort to greater and greater intervention, thereby increasing
the amount of economic activity devoted to rent seeking. As
such, a political "vicious circle" may develop. People perceive
that the market mechanism does not function in a way compatible
with socially approved goals because of competitive rent seeking.
A political consensus therefore emerges to intervene further in
the market, rent seeking increases, and further intervention
results.46 6
Only comprehensive reform and deregulation can put a stop to such
rent-seeking and vicious circles of intervention. However, the best way
to avoid the perils of cronyism is to avoid falling into Tullock's "trap"
to begin with. "Our predecessors have made bad mistakes and we are
stuck with them, but we can at least make efforts to prevent our
descendants from having even more such deadweight losses inflicted
upon them.",467 Information technology entrepreneurs and public
policymakers should heed that lesson before cronyism takes hold in this
innovative sector.

465.

See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATIES ON ECONOMICS 858 (3d rev. ed.

1963).
All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve
the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of
affairs which-from the point of view of their authors' and advocates'
valuations-is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were
designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and
preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and
more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy
has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.
Id.
466.
467.

Krueger, supra note 28, at 302.
Tullock, supra note 462, at 678.
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